Inference proceeds from ingredients chosen by the analyst and data. To validate any inferences drawn it is essential that the inputs chosen be deemed appropriate for the data. In the Bayesian context these inputs consist of both the sampling model and the prior. There are thus two possibilities for failure: the data may not have arisen from the sampling model, or the prior may place most of its mass on parameter values that are not feasible in light of the data (referred to here as prior-data conflict). Failure of the sampling model can only be fixed by modifying the model, while prior-data conflict can be overcome if sufficient data is available. We examine how to assess whether or not a prior-data conflict exists, and how to assess when its effects can be ignored for inferences. The concept of prior-data conflict is seen to lead to a partial characterization of what is meant by a noninformative prior or a noninformative sequence of priors.

Relative belief inferences are shown to arise as Bayes rules or limiting Bayes rules. These inferences are invariant under reparameterizations and possess a number of optimal properties. In particular, relative belief inferences are based on a direct measure of statistical evidence.

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A question of some interest is how to characterize the amount of information that a prior puts into a statistical analysis. Rather than a general characterization, we provide an approach to characterizing the amount of information a prior puts into an analysis, when compared to another base prior. The base prior is considered to be the prior that best reflects the current available information. Our purpose then is to characterize priors that can be used as conservative inputs to an analysis relative to the base prior. The characterization that we provide is in terms of a priori measures of prior-data conflict.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/11-STS357 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

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