No abstract

Today, many regulators' operations publish information derived from registration and reporting by charitable organizations and commercial fundraising firms. Similar publication is found in a variety of situationsrestaurant sanitation notices and hospital re-infection rates, among many others. Recent scholarship has explored the theory of regulatory disclosure, identifying how required disclosures can influence organizational behavior and potentially improve public welfare. An important feature of this theory is the "action cycle," in which a requirement to disclose information about a process or product shapes consumers' choices, in turn inducing suppliers to modify their behavior in a desired direction. In this paper, we sketch briefly three widespread approaches that have at different times characterized the regulators' efforts, describe some of the inherent difficulties that regulators, whether independent or governmental, will encounter in connection with charitable activities, and explore the potential for constraining or eliminating abusive practices by required public disclosure of related information.

The growing use of donor-advised funds (DAFs) is changing the way many donors give to charity. Despite the increasing influence and importance of DAFs in the nonprofit sector, very little is known about how people actually use them. We conducted 48 in-depth interviews with DAF users, collecting rich qualitative data about why and how donors use DAFs. We use these data to sketch a DAF giving process with four phases and multiple decision points. We highlight some of the common donor strategies that are used with DAFs. Overall, we present evidence of abundant diversity in individual adaptation for giving through DAFs.

Do donors seek out potentially adverse information about organizations making fundraising appeals? Do they react when it is readily available? Do they draw negative inferences when critical information is not available? To answer these questions, we consider previously unexamined large-scale natural experiments involving U.S. charitable organizations—tax-exempt organizations that file Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990. Using standard difference-in-differences designs, we find that donors penalize organizations with high fundraising costs when there is mandatory disclosure or involuntary disclosure by a third-party reporter. Organizations with lower fundraising costs fundraise more successfully in the presence of these disclosures. The contrast with donors’ behavior when such information is not available suggests that donors do not draw correct inferences when potentially consequential information is not disclosed. Disclose-on-request requirements, in contrast, apparently do not have any significant impact on donors’ or organizations’ behavior. We then sketch implications for the regulation of donations to charities and their modern cousins, such as crowdfunding and social enterprise organizations.