Among organizations that recognize that a multidimensional perspective is necessary to integrate stakeholder needs into a long term value creation process, only in a few cases are performance measurement systems able to integrate fi nancial indicators with social and environmental metrics. This paper fi rst discusses the sustainability concept for management accounting purposes. After reviewing the literature addressing performance measurement system issues, the paper offers a view as to how implementation of management accounting for sustainability could progress. We suggest a performance measurement system based on two managerial instruments that organize a set of primary and secondary measures, connected with stakeholder satisfaction, and are able to detect and articulate both win-win and trade-off situations.

We find evidence consistent with Italian nonlisted subsidiaries engaging in accrual and real earnings management, so that their listed parents can meet or beat benchmarks. Thus, the parent firm drives the earnings management of the subsidiaries. We identify parents that are more likely to have managed earnings as the ones that avoid a small loss or meet or beat analyst forecast by a few cents. Cross‐sectional analysis reveals that Big 4 auditors mitigate accrual earnings management at the subsidiary level and that family‐owned firms use earnings management through nonlisted subsidiaries mainly to avoid reporting losses. Finally, we find that parent firms communicate earnings management strategies to their subsidiaries using board proximity. Our evidence shows that business groups manage earnings differently from single firms, pushing earnings management down to subsidiaries. It also supports the monitoring role of Big 4 auditors in a business group setting and contributes to understanding financial reporting decisions in family‐owned firms.

We introduce a measure of customer franchise value for subscription‐based companies—a fast growing and vital sector of the economy. This measure is based on information voluntarily disclosed by some, but not all, firms. Controlling for self‐selection, we examine the measure's information content and find that customer value is significantly positively associated with stock price and this association is incremental to both GAAP and a set of non‐GAAP variables typically considered in valuation tests. Furthermore, we show that the customer value measure is positively associated with future earnings and analysts' forecast errors. Importantly, we find that the documented results are robust to controlling for the individual inputs used to derive the measure, highlighting the need to consider the interaction between stand‐alone value drivers in assessing a firm's performance. These findings indicate that the proposed measure of customer value is an important valuation tool that quantifies and summarizes the main trends and factors underlying the performance of subscription‐based enterprises. This study informs researchers and investors, as well as accounting policymakers, about a major value‐generating asset currently missing from corporate financial reports.

We examine how heterogeneity in organizational structure affects private firm earnings quality in the European Union. Organizational structure refers to whether the firm is organized as a single legal entity (standalone) or as a business group. Private firms can be organized either way, while public firms are de facto groups. Even though private firms are not affected by market forces, we show that private business groups face greater stakeholder pressure for earnings quality than do standalone firms, while standalone firms have stronger tax minimization incentives. Due to these differences in nonmarket forces, private business groups have higher earnings quality than standalone firms. This heterogeneity among private firms is an important unexplored factor in the study of private firms, affecting the comparison between public and private firm earnings quality. We find that overall, public firms have higher earnings quality than private firms but this relation reverses when we control for nonmarket forces by examining business groups only.

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