Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to examine determinants of the decision to disclose intellectual capital in annual reports. Design/methodology/approach-The paper derives theoretical predictions from the previous literature and bases the study on archival data with a sample of 125 publicly listed Australian firms. The authors perform a content analysis of annual reports and complement the data with quantitative data from the sample firms. Findings-The paper finds that industry type plays a key role as a determinant for the disclosure of intellectual property in annual reports. In addition, firm size is another determinant for intellectual disclosure of firms. In contrast with earlier studies and theoretical predictions of voluntary disclosure, however, the paper does not find any relationship between the level of information asymmetry and intellectual capital disclosure. Research limitations/implications-One limitation refers to the content analysis. Analyzing the annual reports based on the specified list of IC-related terms may not provide the whole picture as well as the IC disclosure practices. Despite these limitations, the study helps to understand better in general what kind of firms actually disclose information on intellectual capital. Originality/value-In contrast with earlier studies the study uses significantly more observations, which makes the results more reliable and generalizable. Of further significance is the finding that information asymmetry-one of the main problems between investors and firms-is not driving the decision of firms to disclose information on intellectual capital.

Purpose-This paper aims to examine the association between audit firm tenure and audit report lag (ARL) and the impact of auditor industry specialization on the association between audit firm tenure and ARL. Design/Methodology/Approach-Using Habib and Bhuiyan's (2011) method of measuring auditor industry specialization, the authors examine the sample of 7,291 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2010. Findings-The authors find that auditor industry specialization (regardless of city-level, national-level and joint city-and national-level industry specialization) weakens the positive association between ARL and short audit firm tenure, suggesting that auditor industry specialization complements the negative effect of short audit firm tenure on ARL. Originality/value-First, the authors add to the literature by answering the question of whether hiring industry auditor specialists is an effective way to shorten ARL created by short audit tenure. The authors provide some evidence that the concern of short audit tenure leading to longer ARL is reduced by hiring an industry-specialized auditor. Prior research mainly focuses on identifying the determinants of ARL without going further to find out which are the effective ways to reduce the audit delay. Second, their findings can somehow resolve the debate on whether audit firm rotation should be mandatory. A new auditor's lack of knowledge of clients' business operations during the early years of audit engagements results in longer ARL, which eventually influences the clients' financial performance. The authors' result suggests the firms can reduce this adverse consequence by hiring an industry-specialized auditor. Finally, their findings may provide helpful information to firms in selecting external auditors, public accounting firms in selecting a differentiation strategy and regulators in mandating audit firm rotation.

This paper documents the downward trend in the labor share of global income since the early 1990s, as well as its heterogeneous evolution across countries, industries and worker skill groups, using a newly assembled dataset, and analyzes the drivers behind it. Technological progress, along with varying exposure to routine occupations, explains about half the overall decline in advanced economies, with a larger negative impact on middle-skilled workers. In emerging markets, the labor share evolution is explained predominantly by global integration, particularly the expansion of global value chains that contributed to raising the overall capital intensity in production.

The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP), formed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has recommended that all public companies be required to have shareholder ratification of auditor selection. Using data from 1,382 firms for the year ending December 31, 2006, we find that audit fees are higher in firms with shareholder voting on auditor ratification. We also find that firms that started having a shareholder vote pay higher fees than firms that stopped having a shareholder vote. In the second part of our study, we find that in firms with shareholder voting on auditor selection (1) subsequent restatements are less likely and (2) abnormal accruals are lower. Our findings are consistent with the experimental results in Mayhew and Pike (2004), and provide empirical grounding for the debate about mandating shareholder voting on auditor selection.

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