Green merger and acquisition (M&A) activities may improve heavy polluters’ regulatory and organisational legitimacy, allowing greater access to resources and enhancing risk‐taking capacity. Adopting a proprietary 2008–2013 dataset, we examine outcomes from green M&A for China’s heavy‐polluting firms. We find that heavy polluters’ green M&A is associated with greater risk‐taking. Greater access to resources, and reduced financing constraints and tax liabilities suggest improved legitimacy. These effects are positively related to state ownership and government intervention in the M&A process. Our findings support the Porter hypothesis and have policy implications for green management of heavy polluters in emerging markets.

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China’s historical mixed-ownership reform (the Reform) has prioritized enhancing the efficiency and financial performance of its large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through introduction of partial private-sector equity ownership. However, the presence of a significant gap between China’s private enterprises’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and those of its SOEs suggests potential for Reform-related ownership changes to negatively impact economy-wide CSR performance. We therefore examine the Reform’s impact on private acquirer firms’ CSR practices. We use a proprietary data set of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, covering the 2011–2015 period. Our findings identify that private firms can enhance their economic and political status through acquiring equity in state-controlled or SOEs and, following this, improve their CSR practices. Our findings have policy implications in the context of the world’s largest emerging market and, more generally, for SOE ownership reform in emerging and transition economies.

Purpose – With its rapid economic expansion and its growing environmental and social issues, China has introduced explicit corporate social responsibility (CSR) regulations since 2006 as part of its social harmony policy. The purpose of this paper is to examine the CSR disclosure practices of the historically unaccountable mining firms in China’s current regulatory context. Design/methodology/approach – The sample covers all 60 listed mining firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2007 and 2012, totalling 360 firm-year observations. The authors adopt the “Chinese CSR Report Preparation Guide” as the benchmark for content analysis. To strengthen the analysis, the authors apply binary logistic regression with the determinants of state government, social responsibility index, and cross-listing overseas status. Findings – The authors discover that mining firms rapidly adopt CSR disclosure in response to the regulatory pressures from the state government and the stock exchanges to maintain legitimacy and survival prospects. However, the quality of CSR disclosures becomes a new concern. Research limitations/implications – The most environmentally and socially sensitive mining sector can provide good samples of firm CSR practice in the second largest economy. Although mandatory requirements may result in the firms’ passive compliance, strict regulation is still the key to the changes in corporate accountability and transparency. China may need to strengthen its CSR regulation for its sustainable growth in the coming Asian Era. Practical implications – In the institutional context of China, the imposition of strict regulation seems to be the key to improving CSR practice. However, the mandatory requirements may also result in passive compliance without effective change in corporate accountability and transparency. The sustainable development of the mining sector and advocacy of CSR behaviour require cooperation at national, social and corporate levels. Originality/value – This study contributes to the evolving CSR literature about China and the literature from an industry perspective where governance and regulation are highly influential. The methodology may also enrich future research in the area with a fairly long sample period.