Global Capital and National Governments, first published in 2003, suggests that international financial integration does not mean the end of social democratic welfare policies. Capital market openness allows participants to react swiftly and severely to government policy; but in the developed world, capital market participants consider only a few government policies when making decisions. Governments that conform to capital market pressures in macroeconomic areas remain relatively unconstrained in supply-side and micro-economic policy areas. Therefore, despite financial globalization, cross-national policy divergence among advanced democracies remains likely. Still, in the developing world, the influence of financial markets on government policy autonomy is more pronounced. The risk of default renders market participants willing to consider a range of government policies in investment decisions. This inference, however, must be tempered with awareness that governments retain choice. As evidence for its conclusions, Global Capital and National Governments draws on interviews with fund managers, quantitative analyses, and archival investment banking materials.

This article explores the impact of economic globalization on workers' rights in developing countries. The authors hypothesize that the impact of globalization on labor rights depends not only on the overall level of economic openness but also on the precise ways in which a country participates in global production networks. Using a new data set on collective labor rights, the authors test these expectations. Their analysis of the correlates of labor rights in 90 developing nations, from 1986 to 2002, highlights globalization's mixed impact on labor rights. As “climb to the top” accounts suggest, foreign direct investment inflows are positively and significantly related to the rights of workers. But at the same time, trade competition generates downward “race to the bottom” pressures on collective labor rights. The authors also find that domestic institutions and labor rights in neighboring countries are important correlates of workers' rights.

This article investigates the nature of the linkages between trade and labor rights in developing countries. Specifically, we hypothesize that a “California effect” serves to transmit superior labor standards from importing to exporting countries, in a manner similar to the transmission of environmental standards. We maintain that, all else being equal, the labor standards of a given country are influenced not by its overall level of trade openness, but by the labor standards of its trading partners. We evaluate our hypothesis using a panel of 90 developing countries over the period 1986–2002, and we separately examine the extent to which the labor laws and the actual labor practices of the countries are influenced by those of their export destinations. We find that strong legal protections of collective labor rights in a country's export destinations are associated with more stringent labor laws in the exporting country. This California effect finding is, however, weaker in the context of labor rights practices, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between formal legislation and actual implementation of labor rights.

Labor Rights and Multinational Production investigates the relationship between workers' rights and multinational production. Layna Mosley argues that some types of multinational production, embodied in directly owned foreign investment, positively affect labor rights. However, other types of international production, particularly subcontracting, can engender competitive races to the bottom in labor rights. To test these claims, Mosley presents newly generated measures of collective labor rights, covering a wide range of low-and middle-income nations for the 1985-2002 period. Labor Rights and Multinational Production suggests that the consequences of economic openness for developing countries are highly dependent on foreign firms' modes of entry and, more generally, on the precise way in which each developing country engages the global economy. The book contributes to the academic literature in comparative and international political economy and to public policy debates regarding the effects of globalization.

A central research question in international and comparative political economy concerns the in uence of international nancial markets on government policy outcomes. To what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices? Does capital market openness render impossible the public provision of education and health care, income redistribution, and active labor market policiesall hallmarks of the contemporary welfare state?I argue that the in uence of international nancial markets on the governments of advanced industrial democracies is somewhat strong, but also somewhat narrow. Capital market openness allows participants in nancial markets to react dramatically to changes in government policy outcomes. Market participants, however, consider only a small set of government policies when deciding how to allocate their assets. Therefore, governments face pressures to adopt market-pleasing policies in aggregate policy areas but retain ''room to move'' in many other policy areas. Despite nancial internationalization, we will observe a signi cant amount of crossnational policy divergence among advanced industrial democracies.I position my analysis within current international and comparative political economy debates and develop expectations regarding the in uence of nancial market pressures on government policies. I then assess these expectations by employing interviews with nancial market participants. I further evaluate my hypotheses using a statistical analysis of the determinants of interest rates on government bonds. I brie y discuss governments' responses to nancial market in uences and conclude by offering suggestions for future research.