Observations made in April 2013 of the radioxenon isotopes (133)Xe and (131m)Xe at measurement stations in Japan and Russia, belonging to the International Monitoring System for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, are unique with respect to the measurement history of these stations. Comparison of measured data with calculated isotopic ratios as well as analysis using atmospheric transport modeling indicate that it is likely that the xenon measured was created in the underground nuclear test conducted by North Korea on February 12, 2013, and released 7-8 weeks later. More than one release is required to explain all observations. The (131m)Xe source terms for each release were calculated to 0.7 TBq, corresponding to about 1-10% of the total xenon inventory for a 10 kt explosion, depending on fractionation and release scenario. The observed ratios could not be used to obtain any information regarding the fissile material that was used in the test.

In October 2017, most European countries reported unique atmospheric detections of aerosol-bound radioruthenium (106Ru). The range of concentrations varied from some tenths of µBq·m−3 to more than 150 mBq·m−3. The widespread detection at such considerable (yet innocuous) levels suggested a considerable release. To compare activity reports of airborne 106Ru with different sampling periods, concentrations were reconstructed based on the most probable plume presence duration at each location. Based on airborne concentration spreading and chemical considerations, it is possible to assume that the release occurred in the Southern Urals region (Russian Federation). The 106Ru age was estimated to be about 2 years. It exhibited highly soluble and less soluble fractions in aqueous media, high radiopurity (lack of concomitant radionuclides), and volatility between 700 and 1,000 °C, thus suggesting a release at an advanced stage in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The amount and isotopic characteristics of the radioruthenium release may indicate a context with the production of a large 144Ce source for a neutrino experiment.

A high‐precision radionuclide monitoring site was established in Yellowknife/Canada in 2003. Far away from nuclear activities, regular signals of 137Cs were found there during the summers of 2003 and 2004. We show that these signals can be explained by transport from fires burning in the boreal forests of North America and Asia. This finding has important implications. It demonstrates that 137Cs deposited world‐wide from past nuclear testing is re‐injected into the atmosphere by combustion to a significant extent and on a large scale, and is subsequently transported across great distances. Besides this, the analysis shows how efficiently a new receptor‐oriented atmospheric transport modeling technique can be used to check whether a 3D emission inventory is consistent with discrete point measurements.

This paper applies a Bayesian probabilistic inferential methodology for the reconstruction of the location and emission rate from an actual contaminant source (emission from the Chalk River Laboratories medical isotope production facility) using a small number of activity concentration measurements of a noble gas (Xenon-133) obtained from three stations that form part of the International Monitoring System radionuclide network. The sampling of the resulting posterior distribution of the source parameters is undertaken using a very efficient Markov chain Monte Carlo technique that utilizes a multiple-try differential evolution adaptive Metropolis algorithm with an archive of past states. It is shown that the principal difficulty in the reconstruction lay in the correct specification of the model errors (both scale and structure) for use in the Bayesian inferential methodology. In this context, two different measurement models for incorporation of the model error of the predicted concentrations are considered. The performance of both of these measurement models with respect to their accuracy and precision in the recovery of the source parameters is compared and contrasted.

Traces of particulate radioactive iodine (I) were detected in the European atmosphere in January/February 2017. Concentrations of this nuclear fission product were very low, ranging 0.1 to 10 μBq m except at one location in western Russia where they reached up to several mBq m. Detections have been reported continuously over an 8-week period by about 30 monitoring stations. We examine possible emission source apportionments and rank them considering their expected contribution in terms of orders of magnitude from typical routine releases: radiopharmaceutical production units > sewage sludge incinerators > nuclear power plants > spontaneous fission of uranium in soil. Inverse modeling simulations indicate that the widespread detections of I resulted from the combination of multiple source releases. Among them, those from radiopharmaceutical production units remain the most likely. One of them is located in Western Russia and its estimated source term complies with authorized limits. Other existing sources related toI use (medical purposes or sewage sludge incineration) can explain detections on a rather local scale. As an enhancing factor, the prevailing wintertime meteorological situations marked by strong temperature inversions led to poor dispersion conditions that resulted in higher concentrations exceeding usual detection limits in use within the informal Ring of Five (Ro5) monitoring network.