<p> <span>This paper studies secure implementability (T. Saijo, T. Sjostrom</span><span> </span><span>and T. Yamato, </span><span>“</span><span>Secure Implementation,</span><span>” </span><i><span>Theoreti</span></i><i><span>cal Economics</span></i><span>, Vol. 2, </span><span>No. 3, </span><span>2007, pp.</span><span> </span><span>203-</span><span>2</span><span>29) in queueing problems. Our main result shows that the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness (Z. Ritz, </span><span>“</span><span>Restricted Domains, Arrow-Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Non-Manipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private Alternatives,</span><span>” </span><i><span>Mathematical Social Science</span></i><span>, </span><span>Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp.</span><span> </span><span>155-179), both of which are necessary for secure imple</span><span>- </span><span>mentation, if and only if it is constant on the domains that satisfy weak indifference introduced in this paper. Weak in</span><span>- </span><span>difference is weaker than minimal richness (Y. Fujinaka and T. Wakayama, </span><span>“</span><span>Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money,</span><span>”</span><span> <i>Economics Letters</i>, Vol. 100, </span><span>No. 1, </span><span>2008, pp.</span><span> </span><span>91-95). Our main result illustrates that secure implementation is too difficult in queueing problems since many reasonable domains satisfy weak indifference, for example, convex domains.</span> </p>
This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, T. (1973) "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica 41, pp.617-631) are securely implementable in some of the economies, we have the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions.
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