This paper develops a methodology to estimate the regional economic impacts of electricity lifeline disruptions caused by a catastrophic earthquake. The methodology is based on specially designed input-output and linear programming models. A simulation of a major earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone near Memphis, Tennessee, indicates the potential production loss over the recovery period could amount to as much as 7 percent of gross regional product. Reallocation of scarce electricity across sectors could reduce the impacts substantially. Additionally, an improved restoration pattern of electricity transmission substations across subareas could reduce losses even more.

Developing and developed countries need to increase their investments in infrastructure to support economic growth, productivity, and the competitiveness of their economies to enhance the well being of their populations. Some of these investments, being long term, illiquid and considered public services, tend to be undertaken by the public sector. Nevertheless, in some sectors and at different points in history, there has been considerable participation by the private sector. For the purposes of enhancing these investments, all possible options of private and public participation must be considered and the needs are such that ideology and semantics should not get in the way. From the very extensive experience in developing countries, it has been learned that selecting the proper modalities can enhance the long term viability of the investments, can increase the number of bankable projects, attract investments and reduce backlash from failures. These lessons can be applied to developed countries as well. This paper presents a model for the selection of the most suitable service delivery modalities adapted to the prevailing local conditions of the country.

El presente artículo hace un breve repaso de las principales cuestiones que afectan a la gestión de la marca en un mercado progresivamente globalizado muy cambiante y lleno de conflictos. La introducción del valor en la gestión de la marca ha complicado todavía más las acciones de comunicación porque introduce contenidos y modelos de gestión que no siempre cabe comunicar a través de las herramientas tradicionales de la comunicación de marca. El valor exige nuevas formas de pensar la comunicación y nuevos modelos que requieren el compromiso de la política y del conjunto de la sociedad. Este valor expresa la necesidad de un nuevo paradigma que exige pensar de otra manera la empresa y el universo corporativo.The present article gives a brief summary of the main factors that affect brand management in an increasingly globalized, highly unstable and conflictive market. The inclusion of a «value concept» into the brand management has further complicated communicational matters, mainly because it has introduced contents and management models that cannot always be communicated by use of traditional branding tools. The value demands not only new ways of thinking about communication but also new models that require commitment of both political institutions and society as a whole.This value expresses the necessity of applying a new paradigm that implies a change in the way we understand business and the universe of corporate communications. ABSTRACT RESUMEN

In this paper we revisit incentive contract design in a simple setting, after developing a model that captures the fact that in weak institutional settings the procurement of large scale public works through contracts with strong incentives for private firms, may result in excessive litigation over contract terms. This result is possible because we assume that parties in litigation can influence (by purchasing better or more legal services) the observable merits of their case. In weak institutional settings, governments have an inherent disadvantage in these litigation contests. We show that a commitment to a prespecified level of litigation effort by the government, together with weaker incentive contracts, is a more efficient procurement mechanism. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005incentive contracts, infrastructure provision, litigation, asymmetric information,

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