No abstract

Lab-in-the-field experiment reveals that humans display a reduced set of consistent behavioral phenotypes in dyadic games.

Citizen science broadly refers to the active engagement of the general public in scientific research tasks. Citizen science is a growing practice in which scientists and citizens collaborate to produce new knowledge for science and society. Although citizen science has been around for centuries, the term citizen science was coined in the 1990s and has gained popularity since then. Recognition of citizen science is growing in the fields of science, policy, and education and in wider society. It is establishing itself as a field of research and a field of practice, increasing the need for overarching insights, standards, vocabulary, and guidelines. In this editorial chapter we outline how this book is providing an overview of the field of citizen science.

In this paper we develop a model of an order-driven market where traders set bids and asks and post market or limit orders according to exogenously fixed rules. The model developed here extends the earlier one of Chiarella and Iori (2002) in several important aspects, in particular agents have heterogenous time horizons and can submit orders of sizes larger than one, determined either by utility maximisation or by a random selection procedure. The model seeks to capture a number of features suggested by recent empirical analysis of limit order data, such as; fat-tailed distribution of limit order placement from current bid/ask; fat-tailed distribution of order execution-time; fat-tailed distribution of orders stored in the order book; long memory in the signs (buy or sell) of trades. We analyze the impact of chartist and fundamentalist strategies on the determination of both the placement level and the placement size, on the shape of the book, the distribution of orders at different prices, and the distribution of their execution time. We compare the results of model simulations with real market data.

While human societies are extraordinarily cooperative in comparison with other social species, the question of why we cooperate with unrelated individuals remains open. Here we report results of a lab-in-the-field experiment with people of different ages in a social dilemma. We find that the average amount of cooperativeness is independent of age except for the elderly, who cooperate more, and a behavioural transition from reciprocal, but more volatile behaviour to more persistent actions towards the end of adolescence. Although all ages react to the cooperation received in the previous round, young teenagers mostly respond to what they see in their neighbourhood regardless of their previous actions. Decisions then become more predictable through midlife, when the act of cooperating or not is more likely to be repeated. Our results show that mechanisms such as reciprocity, which is based on reacting to previous actions, may promote cooperation in general, but its influence can be hindered by the fluctuating behaviour in the case of children.