By 9 December 2021, 785 SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant cases have been identified in Denmark. Most cases were fully (76%) or booster-vaccinated (7.1%); 34 (4.3%) had a previous SARS-CoV-2 infection. The majority of cases with available information reported symptoms (509/666; 76%) and most were infected in Denmark (588/644; 91%). One in five cases cannot be linked to previous cases, indicating widespread community transmission. Nine cases have been hospitalised, one required intensive care and no deaths have been registered.

Following emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 variant Omicron in November 2021, the dominant BA.1 sub-lineage was replaced by the BA.2 sub-lineage in Denmark. We analysed the first 2,623 BA.2 cases from 29 November 2021 to 2 January 2022. No epidemiological or clinical differences were found between individuals infected with BA.1 versus BA.2. Phylogenetic analyses showed a geographic east-to-west transmission of BA.2 from the Capital Region with clusters expanding after the Christmas holidays. Mutational analysis shows distinct differences between BA.1 and BA.2.

Background The continued occurrence of more contagious Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants and waning immunity over time require ongoing reevaluation of the vaccine effectiveness (VE). This study aimed to estimate the effectiveness in 2 age groups (12 to 59 and 60 years or above) of 2 or 3 vaccine doses (BNT162b2 mRNA or mRNA-1273) by time since vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 infection and Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) hospitalization in an Alpha-, Delta-, or Omicron-dominated period. Methods and findings A Danish nationwide cohort study design was used to estimate VE against SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 hospitalization with the Alpha, Delta, or Omicron variant. Information was obtained from nationwide registries and linked using a unique personal identification number. The study included all previously uninfected residents in Denmark aged 12 years or above (18 years or above for the analysis of 3 doses) in the Alpha (February 20 to June 15, 2021), Delta (July 4 to November 20, 2021), and Omicron (December 21, 2021 to January 31, 2022) dominated periods. VE estimates including 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated (1-hazard ratio∙100) using Cox proportional hazard regression models with underlying calendar time and adjustments for age, sex, comorbidity, and geographical region. Vaccination status was included as a time-varying exposure. In the oldest age group, VE against infection after 2 doses was 90.7% (95% CI: 88.2; 92.7) for the Alpha variant, 82.3% (95% CI: 75.5; 87.2) for the Delta variant, and 39.9% (95% CI: 26.3; 50.9) for the Omicron variant 14 to 30 days since vaccination. The VE waned over time and was 73.2% (Alpha, 95% CI: 57.1; 83.3), 50.0% (Delta, 95% CI: 46.7; 53.0), and 4.4% (Omicron, 95% CI: −0.1; 8.7) >120 days since vaccination. Higher estimates were observed after the third dose with VE estimates against infection of 86.1% (Delta, 95% CI: 83.3; 88.4) and 57.7% (Omicron, 95% CI: 55.9; 59.5) 14 to 30 days since vaccination. Among both age groups, VE against COVID-19 hospitalization 14 to 30 days since vaccination with 2 or 3 doses was 98.1% or above for the Alpha and Delta variants. Among both age groups, VE against COVID-19 hospitalization 14 to 30 days since vaccination with 2 or 3 doses was 95.5% or above for the Omicron variant. The main limitation of this study is the nonrandomized study design including potential differences between the unvaccinated (reference group) and vaccinated individuals. Conclusions Two vaccine doses provided high protection against SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 hospitalization with the Alpha and Delta variants with protection, notably against infection, waning over time. Two vaccine doses provided only limited and short-lived protection against SARS-CoV-2 infection with Omicron. However, the protection against COVID-19 hospitalization following Omicron SARS-CoV-2 infection was higher. The third vaccine dose substantially increased the level and duration of protection against infection with the Omicron variant and provided a high level of sustained protection against COVID-19 hospitalization among the +60-year-olds.

The COVID‐19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented demand for real‐time surveillance data in order to inform critical decision makers regarding the management of the pandemic. The aim of this review was to describe how the Danish national microbiology database, MiBa, served as a cornerstone for providing data to the real‐time surveillance system by linkage to other nationwide health registries. The surveillance system was established on an existing IT health infrastructure and a close network between clinical microbiologists, information technology experts, and public health officials. In 2020, testing capacity for SARS‐CoV‐2 was ramped up from none to over 10,000 weekly PCR tests per 100,000 population. The crude incidence data mirrored this increase in testing. Real‐time access to denominator data and patient registries enabled adjustments for fluctuations testing activity, providing robust data on crude SARS‐CoV‐2 incidence during the changing diagnostic and management strategies. The use of the same data for different purposes, for example, final laboratory reports, information to the public, contact tracing, public health, and science, has been a critical asset for the pandemic response. It has also raised issues concerning data protection and critical capacity of the underlying technical systems and key resources. However, even with these limitations, the setup has enabled decision makers to adopt timely interventions. The experiences from COVID‐19 may motivate a transformation from traditional indicator‐based public health surveillance to an all‐encompassing information system based on access to a comprehensive set of data sources, including diagnostic and reference microbiology.

In organized cervical screening programs, typically 25% of the invited women do not attend. The Copenhagen Self‐sampling Initiative (CSi) aimed to gain experiences on participation among screening nonattenders in the Capital Region of Denmark. Here, we report on the effectiveness of different communication platforms used in the pilot with suggestions for strategies prior to a full‐implementation. Moreover, an innovative approach using self‐sampling brushes with unique radio frequency identification chips allowed for unprecedented levels patient identification safety. Nonattenders from the capital region of Denmark were identified via the organized national invitation module. Screening history was obtained via the nationwide pathology registry. Twenty‐four thousand women were invited, and as an alternative to the regular communication platforms (letter and phone), women could request a home test via a mobile‐friendly webpage. Instruction material and video‐animation in several languages were made available online. Chi‐square test was used to test differences. Out of all invited, 31.7% requested a home test, and 20% returned it to the laboratory. In addition, 10% were screened at the physician after receiving the invitation. Stratified by screening history, long‐term unscreened women were less likely to participate than intermittently screened women (28% vs. 16%, p < 0.001). Of all contacts received, 64% (63–65) came via letter, and 31% (95CI: 30–32%) via webpage/mobile‐app. Self‐sampling was well‐accepted among nonattenders. Adopting modern technology‐based platforms into the current organized screening program would serve as a convenient communication method between health authority and citizens, allowing easy access for the citizen and reducing the work load in administrating self‐sampling approaches.