A common objection to particular views of attributability is that they fail to account for weakness of will. In this paper, I show that the problem of weakness of will is much deeper than has been recognized, extending to all views of attributability on offer because of the general form that these views take. The fundamental problem is this: current views claim that being attributionally responsible is a matter of exercising whatever capacity that they take to be relevant to attributability; however, weakness of will cases show that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise that capacity. I propose a novel solution that any view of attributability can and must take on board in order to be viable. The solution is to recognize that being attributionally responsible is not fundamentally a matter of exercising the attributability-relevant capacity (whatever a particular view identifies that capacity to be) but is rather a matter of having that capacity, so long as that capacity figures in the explanation of the action.Keywords Attributability Á Moral responsibility Á Weakness of will Á Capacity A common objection to particular views of attributability is that they fail to account for weakness of will. In this paper, I show that the problem of weakness of will is much deeper than has been recognized, extending to all views of attributability on offer because of the general form that these views take. I then propose a novel solution that any view of attributability can and must adopt in order to be viable.
I argue that divine forgiveness is God's openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. The main advantage of this view is that it explains the power of divine forgiveness to reconcile us to God when we repent. As I show, this view also fits well with the parable of the prodigal son, which is commonly taken to illustrate divine forgiveness, and it accounts for the close connection between divine forgiveness and Christ's atonement. Finally, I demonstrate that this view is particularly wellsuited, although not committed, to the idea that God forgives us without our repentance. The parable of the prodigal son provides a powerful illustration of forgiveness (Luke 15:11-32). The son asks for his share of the inheritance and, after receiving it, leaves home and squanders it on wild living. When he has nothing left, he hires himself out to take care of pigs, and he longs to eat the pods that the pigs are eating. Eventually, he comes to his senses, realizing that his father's servants have food to spare. He journeys home to repent and to ask his father to treat him like one of the servants. While he is still a long way off, his father sees him and has compassion on him. The father runs to his son, embraces him, and, when the son expresses repentance, does not even give him the chance to ask to be like the hired help. Instead, the father directs his servants to bring out the best robe, a ring, and sandals for his son and to prepare a great feast to celebrate his return. The forgiveness bestowed by the father in the parable of the prodigal son, meant by Jesus to represent divine forgiveness, beautifully exemplifies and supports the account of divine forgiveness that I develop and defend in this paper. On this account, divine forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect to the wrongdoing. In the parable, the father is clearly open to reconciliation with his son: he runs to his son and embraces him; he throws a party for his son and puts the best clothes on him. Through these actions, he demonstrates to the repentant prodigal son and to those around them that they are reconciled, that the son's status as a beloved son is intact. On the view that I defend, the father's openness to reconciliation with his son constitutes his forgiving his son. As the father's forgiveness is a picture of divine forgiveness, I claim that God's openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, constitutes His forgiving us.
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