Ranked-choice voting (RCV) is a class of reforms increasingly used in the United States to replace plurality and runoff elections. We ask whether support for RCV taps a larger generational divide in politics. We consult five surveys, two of these from recent adoption campaigns, and all with different ways of asking about RCV support. Generation is a significant predictor in four of these samples, accounting for standard demographic factors and partisanship. This relationship also holds within black and Republican subgroups, two groups often thought to be less likely to support RCV. Finally, we find that dissatisfaction with "the way that democracy works in America" is a plausible link between generation and reform support. For better or worse, RCV has potential to divide two important voting blocs in America. Our results suggest that, rather than turn away from electoral politics, a disaffected young generation may turn to reform.
This chapter lays out the "shifting coalitions" theory of electoral reform and applies it to out-of-sample reform episodes. The key premise is that electoral-system change is about control of government. The motivating model is based on multiple policy dimensions, resulting in a coalition with internal tensions. Reform involves the activation of such tensions. Three reform types result: insulating, realigning, and polarizing. Five bargaining dimensions in reform are laid out: assembly size, district magnitude, ballot type, allocation rule, and rules about nominations. Reforms can be pro- or anti-party, depending on the composition of the reform coalition. In turn, that composition depends partly on the pre-existing number of parties. Finally, reforms shape governance in the medium term by shaping the number of "bargaining units."
Ranked-choice voting has come to mean a range of electoral systems. Broadly, they can facilitate (a) majority winners in single-seat districts, (b) majority rule with minority representation in multi-seat districts, or (c) majority sweeps in multi-seat districts. Further, such systems can combine with rules to encourage/discourage slate voting. This article describes five major versions used, abandoned, and/or proposed for US public elections: alternative vote, single transferable vote, block-preferential voting, the bottoms-up system, and alternative vote with numbered posts. It then considers each from the perspective of a ‘political strategist.’ Simple models of voting (one with two parties, another with three) draw attention to real-world strategic issues: effects on minority representation, importance of party cues, and reasons for the political strategist to care about how voters rank choices. Unsurprisingly, different rules produce different outcomes with the same sets of ballots. Specific problems from the strategist’s perspective are: ‘majority reversal,’ serving ‘two masters,’ and undisciplined third-party voters (or ‘pure’ independents). Some of these stem from well-known phenomena, e.g., ranking truncation and ‘vote leakage.’ The article also alludes to ‘vote-management’ tactics, i.e., rationing nominations and ensuring even distributions of first-choice votes. Illustrative examples come from American history and comparative politics. A running theme is the two-pronged failure of the Progressive Era reform wave: with respect to minority representation, then ranked voting's durability.
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