This study examines whether the length of the relationship between a company and an audit firm (audit‐firm tenure) is associated with financial‐reporting quality. Using two proxies for financial‐reporting quality and a sample of Big 6 clients matched on industry and size, we find that relative to medium audit‐firm tenures of four to eight years, short audit‐firm tenures of two to three years are associated with lower‐quality financial reports. In contrast, we find no evidence of reduced financial‐reporting quality for longer audit‐firm tenures of nine or more years. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence pertinent to the recurring debate regarding mandatory audit‐firm rotation — a debate that has, to date, relied on anecdotal evidence and isolated cases.

Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits in the U.S. in order to protect the firm's brand name reputation and to avoid costly litigation. In this study, we examine whether the perceived higher quality of a Big 4 audit is related to auditor litigation exposure or to reputation concerns. Specifically, we utilize an estimable proxy for financial reporting credibility—the ex ante cost of equity capital—to examine whether Big 4 auditors are perceived as providing higher quality audits (relative to non-Big 4 auditors) in the U.S., and in the less litigious (but economically similar) environments in other Anglo-American countries during the 1990–99 period. We find that a Big 4 audit is associated with a lower ex ante cost of equity capital for auditees in the U.S. but not in Australia, Canada, or the U.K. Our findings suggest that it is litigation exposure rather than brand name reputation protection that drives perceived audit quality.

Prior research predicts that firms reliant on external financing are more likely to undertake a higher level of disclosure, and a higher disclosure level should, in turn, lead to a lower cost of external financing. This paper tests these predictions outside the United States where alternative legal and financial systems could mitigate the effectiveness of such disclosures and, comprehensively, examines both disclosure incentives and disclosure consequences on cost of capital for a common set of firms. Using a sample from 34 countries, we find that firms in industries with greater external financing needs have higher voluntary disclosure levels, and that an expanded disclosure policy for these firms leads to a lower cost of both debt and equity capital. Crosscountry differences in legal and financial systems affect observed disclosure levels in predicted ways. However, a surprising result in the study is that voluntary disclosure incentives appear to operate independently of country-level factors, which suggests the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in gaining access to lower cost external financing around the world.

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