This paper reviews the achievements of the 'microfinance revolution', through reference to the now extensive literature. It finds that there are many opportunities to improve and innovate. To illustrate this finding, the paper concentrates on examining what we need to know to design and deliver better financial products to the poor, especially the poorest. It argues that financial services for the poor are essentially a matter of helping the poor turn their savings into sums large enough to satisfy a wide range of business, consumption, personal, social and asset-building needs. The range of such 'swaps' should be wide enough to cater for short, medium and long-term needs, and they must be delivered in ways which are convenient, appropriate, safe and affordable. Providing poor people with effective financial services helps them deal with vulnerability and can thereby help reduce poverty. However, the relationship is driven by complex livelihood imperatives and is not simple. Microfinance is not a magic sky-hook that reaches down to pluck the poor out of poverty. It can, however, be a strategically vital platform that the poor can use to raise their own prospects for an escape from poverty. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In low and middle-income countries (LMICs), strict social distancing measures (e.g., nationwide lockdown) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are unsustainable in the long-term due to knock-on socioeconomic and psychological effects. However, an optimal epidemiology-focused strategy for ‘safe-reopening’ (i.e., balancing between the economic and health consequences) remain unclear, particularly given the suboptimal disease surveillance and diagnostic infrastructure in these settings. As the lockdown is now being relaxed in many LMICs, in this paper, we have (1) conducted an epidemiology-based “options appraisal” of various available non-pharmacological intervention options that can be employed to safely lift the lockdowns (namely, sustained mitigation, zonal lockdown and rolling lockdown strategies), and (2) propose suitable application, pre-requisites, and inherent limitations for each measure. Among these, a sustained mitigation-only approach (adopted in many high-income countries) may not be feasible in most LMIC settings given the absence of nationwide population surveillance, generalised testing, contact tracing and critical care infrastructure needed to tackle the likely resurgence of infections. By contrast, zonal or local lockdowns may be suitable for some countries where systematic identification of new outbreak clusters in real-time would be feasible. This requires a generalised testing and surveillance structure, and a well-thought out (and executed) zone management plan. Finally, an intermittent, rolling lockdown strategy has recently been suggested by the World Health Organization as a potential strategy to get the epidemic under control in some LMI settings, where generalised mitigation and zonal containment is unfeasible. This strategy, however, needs to be carefully considered for economic costs and necessary supply chain reforms. In conclusion, while we propose three community-based, non-pharmacological options for LMICs, a suitable measure should be context-specific and based on: (1) epidemiological considerations, (2) social and economic costs, (3) existing health systems capabilities and (4) future-proof plans to implement and sustain the strategy.
summary Through a detailed study of informal credit transactions in a village in northern Bangladesh, the research empirically establishes that increased access to credit from micro‐finance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh has been unable to substitute for the higher‐cost informal credit sources. The reason for this is that MFI lending technology is insensitive to variations in household conditions. Most MFIs put all households on a treadmill of continuously increasing loan size and insist on a fixed repayment schedule. While an easily accessible loan may seem attractive to a cash‐starved poor household, its resource profile and the wider economic and policy environment impose limits on the marginal return to capital. Credit escalation under these circumstances increases the likelihood of cross‐financing to sustain the MFI's line of credit. Target‐group households, in particular, resort to extensive cross‐financing of their loans. It is argued that cross‐financing can have a deleterious effect on the household economy in the long‐run if households continuously manage loan repayment without having the ability to repay. It is suggested that MFI lending technology be redesigned to be sensitive to household initial conditions. Only then can MFIs seriously compete with the informal lenders.
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