Im Jahr 1952 hatte der U.S. Supreme Court darüber zu entscheiden, ob es gegen amerikanisches Verfassungsrecht verstößt, wenn Ausländer wegen ihrer früheren Mitgliedschaft in der Kommunistischen Partei des Landes verwiesen werden. Der Supreme Court schmetterte die Klagen regelrecht ab: Über 30 Jahre lang hätten diese Fremden die Vorteile des Aufenthalts in den USA genossen, es aber nicht für nötig befunden, die amerikanische Staatsangehörigkeit anzunehmen, obwohl die Möglichkeit dazu bestanden hätte. Sie hätten sich als Ausländer dauerhaft im Land aufgehalten und damit doppelte Vorteile, den völkerrechtlichen Fremdenschutz und das Aufenthaltsrecht, genossen. Nun müssten sie mit den Konsequenzen leben: 1 "Dass Ausländer auch nach langem Aufenthalt der Gefahr ausgesetzt sind, ausgewiesen zu werden, ist eine Praxis von großer Härte. Aber es ist eine Waffe der Verteidigung und Vergeltung, bekräftigt durch das Völkerrecht, wonach diese Befugnis jedem souveränen Staat zusteht. Dies ist die traditionelle Macht der Nation über den Fremden […]." 2 Die Dimensionen des Bürgerbegriffs, der hinter der Entscheidung des Supreme Court aufscheint, sind vielschichtig. Es geht um Inklusion und Exklusion, also um Fragen gesellschaftlicher, aber auch politischer Zugehörigkeit, auch um das Dazugehörenwollen. 3 Und es geht um den Zugang Christian Walter 8 1 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy 342 U.S. 580 (585ff.) (1952): "For over thirty years, each of these aliens has enjoyed such advantages as accrue from residence here without renouncing his foreign allegiance or formally acknowledging adherence to the Constitution he now invokes. Each was admitted to the United States, upon passing formidable exclusionary hurdles, in the hope that, after what may be called a probationary period, he would desire and be found desirable for citizenship. Each has been offered naturalization, with all of the rights and privileges of citizenship, conditioned only upon open and honest assumption of undivided allegiance to our government. But acceptance was and is not compulsory. Each has been permitted to prolong his original nationality indefinitely.So long as one thus perpetuates a dual status as an American inhabitant but foreign citizen, he may derive advantages from two sources of law -American and international. […] Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal footing with citizens, but, in others, has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen. Most importantly, to protract this ambiguous status within the country is not his right, but is a matter of permission and tolerance. The Government's power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first arose. […]."2 "That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state. Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien, and we leave the law on the subject as...

This article addresses the problem of democratic legitimacy posed by the executive branch's use of delegated legislative powers. After some remarks on the need for delegated legislation and the problem of legitimation the study identifies in a comparative perspective three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries sufficient democratic legitimation. A first means of democratic legitimation is parliamentary predetermination of the executive role. German law proves that the proper legislature under the Damocles sword of unconstitutionality is in many cases well able to prescribe for the executive a substantive programme of delegated legislation. A second technique of democratic legitimation is that parliament in some way participates in the rule-making procedure. German and British law show that by means of subsequent approval the proper legislature assumes political responsibility for subordinate legislation beyond the original empowerment. The US Supreme Court, however, considers the legislative veto to be unconstitutional. Therefore, American law developed a third approach to solve the problem of democratic legitimacy. American experience makes clear that the democratic legitimation of secondary legislation can also be secured by means of comprehensively involving the public in the delegated legislative process. The author assesses the different models for legitimation and explains that the different approaches suggest valuable solutions to each country's problems.

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