A high need for uniqueness undermines majority influence. Need for uniqueness (a) is a psychological state in which individuals feel indistinguishable from others and (b) motivates compensatory acts to reestablish a sense of uniqueness. Three studies demonstrate that a strive for uniqueness motivates individuals to resist majority influence. In Study 1, the need for uniqueness was measured, and it was found that individuals high in need for uniqueness yielded less to majority influence than those low in need for uniqueness. In Study 2, participants who received personality feedback undermining their feeling of uniqueness agreed less with a majority (vs. minority) position. Study 3 replicated this effect and additionally demonstrated the motivational nature of the assumed mechanism: An alternative means that allowed participants to regain a feeling of uniqueness canceled out the effect of high need for uniqueness on majority influence.

A distinction between guilt and regret in reactions to in‐group atrocities is proposed. Four studies (total N = 1249) support the notion that guilt and regret are distinct emotional reactions. Whereas guilt is a self‐focused, aversive emotional reaction following from appraisals of responsibility and associated with the intention to make amends, regret follows from an empathic victim perspective, is less aversive, and is more strongly associated with positive attitudes towards the victim groups and the intention to engage in intergroup contact. These findings suggest that less aversive emotions like regret are more likely to improve intergroup attitudes after a common history of conflict, but the aversive experience of guilt might be more potent in motivating reparations. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

It was proposed that source cues bias message processing in a direction opposite to cue valence if message content violates cue-based expectancies (contrast hypothesis), but consistent with cue valence if message content is ambiguous (bias hypothesis). In line with these hypotheses, students (N = 123) reported less favourable thoughts and attitudes after reading weak arguments presented by a high (vs. low) expertise source (Expts 1 and 2), and reported more favourable thoughts after reading strong arguments presented by a low (vs. high) expertise source (Expt 2). Conversely, students' thoughts and attitudes were more (less) favourable when a high (low) expertise source presented ambiguous arguments (Expt 2). Results are discussed in relation to dual- vs. single-process accounts of persuasion and models of assimilation and contrast in social judgment.

Building on Hofstede's finding that individualism and social hierarchy are incompatible at the societal level, the authors examined the relationship between individualism-collectivism and orientations toward authority at the individual level. In Study 1, authoritarianism was related to three measures of collectivism but unrelated to three measures of individualism in a U.S. sample (N = 382). Study 2 used Triandis's horizontalvertical individualism-collectivism framework in samples from Bulgaria,

The authors studied effects of majority and minority support on persuasion for nondiscrepant positions. In two experiments, students (N = 188) read messages on previously unknown attitude objects. These messages were attributed to numerical majorities (high consensus) or minorities (low consensus). The results show that consensus information can bias systematic processing of message content. High consensus evoked positively biased cognitive responses that focused on message content (convergent processing), whereas low consensus elicited negatively biased processing that pertained to new aspects of the issue (divergent processing). Post-message attitudes were more positive under high consensus than under low consensus; this effect was mediated via thought valence but not via thought convergence. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated if consensus information preceded message processing but not if it was presented after message processing. Furthermore, in both experiments, cognitive activity was lower if consensus information was presented (vs. not presented) before the message.