We propose a model to analyze the decisions taken by an Autonomous System (AS) when joining the Internet. We first define a realistic model for the interconnection costs incurred and then we use this cost model to perform a game theoretic analysis of the decisions related to the creation of new links in the Internet. The proposed model doesn't fall into the standard category of routing games, hence we devise new tools to solve it by exploiting peculiar properties of our game. We prove analytically the existence of multiple equilibria for specific cases, and provide an algorithm to compute the stable ones. The analysis of the model's outcome highlights the existence of a Price of Anarchy (PoA) and a Price of Stability (PoS), originated by the non-cooperative behavior of the ASes, which optimize their cost function in a selfish and decentralized manner. We further observe the presence of competition between the facilities providing either transit or peering connectivity, caused by the cost differences between these two interconnection strategies.
We propose a model for network optimization in a non-cooperative game setting with specific reference to the Internet connectivity. The model describes the decisions taken by an Autonomous System (AS) when joining the Internet. We first define a realistic model for the interconnection costs incurred; then we use this cost model to perform a game theoretic analysis of the decisions related to link creation and traffic routing, keeping into account the peering/transit dichotomy. The proposed model doesn't fall into the standard category of routing games, hence we devise new tools to solve it by exploiting specific properties of our game. We prove analytically the existence of multiple equilibria 219 220 CHAPTER 14. PEERING VS TRANSIT for several scenarios, and provide an algorithm to compute the stable ones. Thanks to the use of simulations we covered those cases for which analytic results could not be obtained, thus analyzing a broad variety of general scenarios, both ad-hoc and realistic. The analysis of the model's outcome highlights the existence of a Price of Anarchy (PoA) and a Price of Stability (PoS), originated by the non-cooperative behavior of the ASes, which optimize their cost function in a selfish and decentralized manner. We further observe the presence of competition between the facilities providing either transit or peering connectivity, caused by the cost differences between these two interconnection strategies.
We propose a model for network optimization in a non-cooperative game setting with specific reference to the Internet connectivity. We refer to the general model shown in internal report [1], where Autonomous Systems (AS) decisions on link creation and traffic routing are strategically based on realistic interconnection costs, keeping into account the peering/transit dichotomy. Equilibria existence and convergence results were obtained in [1] only for a specific toy problem, while here we study larger scale scenarios which better fit the complex nature of the Internet. We are able to show that equilibria existence and convergence properties still hold for many possible generalizations, yet not all of them, and provide a specific example for which the system enters in a never-ending oscillation. Thanks to the use of simulations we covered those scenarios for which analytic results could not be obtained, thus analyzing a broad variety of general cases which were not studied in [1]. Simulation shows that the system, in the vast majority of cases, converges to an equilibrium. Very interestingly, even in asymmetric scenarios the equilibrium reached suggests that players tend to be symmetric with respect to the peering exchange points and send their asymmetric traffic quota via the transit service providers.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.