We study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets (VRTs). Operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade, as they have since the financial crisis. We show that, no matter the abundance of reserves, VRTs encourage market activity and support the central bank's control over interest rates. We consider (i) the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and (ii) a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the Federal Reserve. Overall, a VRT framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks.

In a monetary economy, we show that price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome without the need for costly simultaneous search or any heterogeneity in preferences, production costs, or search technologies. A distribution of money holdings among buyers makes sellers indifferent across a set of posted prices, leading to a nondegenerate price distribution. This price distribution, in turn, makes buyers indifferent across a range of money balances, rationalizing the non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. We completely characterize the distribution of posted prices and money holdings in any equilibrium. Equilibria with price dispersion admit higher maximum prices than observed in any single-price equilibrium. Also, price dispersion reduces welfare by creating mismatch between posted prices and money balances. Inflation exacerbates this welfare loss by shifting the distribution towards higher prices.

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We develop a model where persistent trade shocks create demand for a basket- backed stablecoin, such as Mark Carney's "synthetic hegemonic currency" or Facebook's recent proposal for Libra. In numerical simulations, we find four main results. First, because of general equilibrium effects of the basket currency on the volatility of currency values, overall demand for that currency is small. Second, despite scant holdings of the basket, its global reach may contribute to substantial increases in welfare if the basket is widely accepted, allowing it to complement holdings of sovereign currencies. Third, we calculate the welfare maximizing composition of the basket, finding that optimal weights depend on the pattern of international acceptance, but that basket composition does not significantly affect welfare. Fourth, despite potential welfare improvements, low demand for the basket currency from buyers limits sellers' incentives to invest in accepting it, suggesting that fears of a so-called global stablecoin replacing domestic sovereign currencies may be overstated.