We examine whether market-wide investor sentiment influences the stock price sensitivity to firm-specific earnings news. Using the recently developed measure of investor sentiment by Baker and Wurgler (2006), we find that the stock price sensitivity to good earnings news is higher during high sentiment periods than during periods of low sentiment, whereas the stock price sensitivity to bad earnings news is higher during periods of low sentiment than during periods of high sentiment. This influence of sentiment is especially pronounced for the earnings news of small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, and stocks with extremely high and low market-to-book ratios. Further analysis suggests that the sentiment-driven mispricing of earnings contributes to the general mispricing of stocks due to investor sentiment. JEL Classifications: D14; D21; G24.

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Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that managers possess. We tackle this challenge by constructing a proxy for managers' private bad news (residual short interest) and then perform a series of tests to validate this proxy. Using management earnings guidance and 8-K filings as measures of voluntary disclosure, we find a negative relation between bad-news disclosure and residual short interest, suggesting that managers withhold bad news in general. This tendency is tempered when firms are exposed to higher litigation risk, and it is strengthened when managers have greater incentives to support the stock price. Based on a novel approach to identifying the presence of bad news, our study adds to the debate on whether managers tend to withhold or release bad news. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

This paper documents pervasive evidence of intra-industry reversals in monthly returns.Unlike the conventional reversal strategy based on stock returns relative to the market portfolio, we document intra-industry return reversals that are larger in magnitude, consistently present over time, and prevalent across sub-group of stocks, including large and liquid stocks. These return reversals are driven by order imbalances and non-informational shocks. Consistent with reversals representing compensation for supplying liquidity, intra-industry reversals are stronger following aggregate market declines and volatile times, reflecting binding capital constraints and limited risk bearing capacity of liquidity providers.