This note introduces the POLITICIZE dataset which contains information on the characteristics of 105 Deliberative Mini-Publics (DMPs) that took place in Europe between 2000 and 2020. Based on coding of experts regarding cases of real-life deliberative experiments in 18 different European countries, the dataset describes the core features of DMPs in Europe. It comprises information on three crucial dimensions: their composition (who deliberates?), their format (how do they deliberate?) and their role (what do they deliberate about and what are their prerogatives?). Hence, the note presents the different variables included in the dataset and reports empirical variations across them, thereby presenting the main contribution of the POLITICIZE dataset: delivering the most systematic and comprehensive efforts of data collection on mini-publics in Europe.

Assessments of party decline and decline of traditional forms of political participation often rely on the argument of party membership decline. Most studies analysing trends in party membership over time focus on aggregate country-level data at a few points in time. While they allow grasping general membership trends, they are not without shortcomings. This article presents the Members and Activists of Political Parties (MAPP) dataset related to the MAPP project. The dataset makes a large amount of data on party membership available to the larger public. The dataset provides 6,307 party membership data observations (M) covering 397 parties in 31 countries, mostly between 1945 and 2014. The article discusses the existing literature and data on party membership trends, how membership trends have been assessed so far, and the potential added value of the MAPP dataset.

As representative democracy is increasingly criticized, a new institution is becoming popular among academics and practitioners: deliberative citizens' assemblies. To evaluate whether these assemblies can deliver their promise of re-engaging the dissatisfied of representative politics, we explore who supports them and why. We build on a unique survey conducted with representative samples of 15 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 2Western European countries and find, first, that the most supportive are those who are less educated, have a low sense of political competence and an anti-elite sentiment. Thus, support does come from the dissatisfied. Second, we find that this support is for a part 'outcome contingent', in the sense that it changes with respondents' expectations regarding the policy outcome from deliberative citizens' assemblies. This second finding nuances the first one and suggests that while deliberative citizens' assemblies convey some hope to re-engage disengaged citizens, this is conditioned to the expectation of a favourable outcome.

Using an ego-centered network approach, we examine across two studies whether and how injunctive network norms-behaviors that are approved by alters-are related to majority members' decisions to participate in helping actions supporting migrants. We hypothesize that the more people perceive their personal social networks as positive toward humanitarian actions for migrants, the more they consider their opinions on migration issues as self-defining, and the more they are willing to mobilize in helping behaviors. With a name generator approach, we collected personal social network data among majority members of Belgian, mobilized volunteers (Study 1, N = 204) and Swiss, non-mobilized participants (Study 2, N = 247). Results demonstrate the impact of injunctive network norms in promoting and maintaining helping actions for migrants, and the role of self-defining attitudes. Overall, the results highlight the importance of injunctive norms within personal social networks for participation in intergroup helping behaviors.

Although Europeans are favourable towards the idea of being governed by ‘independent experts’, and despite the burgeoning literature on technocratic ministers, we still miss important information about the profiles of technocrats in government. This article provides new insights into the characteristics of non-partisan, non-elected ministers and the roles they perform once in government based on a Technocratic Ministers’ Dataset covering all governments in 31 European countries from 2000 to 2020. First, we show that average share of technocratic (as opposed to partisan) ministers in European cabinets rose from 9.5% to 14.2% over the last two decades. This increase is characteristic of all macro-regions, except Scandinavian countries. Second, technocratic ministers are assigned to a diversity of portfolios and not just finance and economy, which, respectively, account for only 15% of technocratic ministers. Finally, technocratic ministers do not hold office for shorter periods of time than partisan ones, except when they are part of caretaker cabinets.