BackgroundPerformance based financing (PBF) has been increasingly implemented across low and middle-income countries, including in fragile and humanitarian settings, which present specific features likely to require adaptation and to influence implementation of any health financing programme. However, the literature has been surprisingly thin in the discussion of how PBF has been adapted to different contexts, and in turn how different contexts may influence PBF. With case studies from three humanitarian settings (northern Nigeria, Central African Republic and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo), we examine why and how PBF has emerged and has been adapted to those unsettled and dynamic contexts, what the opportunities and challenges have been, and what lessons can be drawn.MethodsOur comparative case study is based on data collected from a document review, 35 key informant interviews and 16 focus group discussions with stakeholders at national and subnational level in the three settings. Data were analysed in order to describe and compare each setting in terms of underlying fragility features and their implications for the health system, and to look at how PBF has been adopted, implemented and iteratively adapted to respond to acute crisis, deal with other humanitarian actors and involve local communities.ResultsOur analysis reveals that the challenging environments required a high degree of PBF adaptation and innovation, at times contravening the so-called ‘PBF principles’ that have become codified. We develop an analytical framework to highlight the key nodes where adaptations happen, the contextual drivers of adaptation, and the organisational elements that facilitate adaptation and may sustain PBF programmes.ConclusionsOur study points to the importance of pragmatic adaptation in PBF design and implementation to reflect the contextual specificities, and identifies elements (such as, organisational flexibility, local staff and knowledge, and embedded long-term partners) that could facilitate adaptations and innovations. These findings and framework are useful to spark a reflection among PBF donors and implementers on the relevance of incorporating, reinforcing and building on those elements when designing and implementing PBF programmes.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.1186/s13031-018-0166-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Background: Relationships of power, responsibility and accountability between health systems actors are considered central to health governance. Despite increasing attention to the role of accountability in health governance a gap remains in understanding how local accountability relations function within the health system in Central Asia. This study addresses this gap by exploring local health governance in two districts of Tajikistan using principal-agent theory. Methods: This comparative case study uses a qualitative research methodology, relying on key informant interviews and focus group discussions with local stakeholders. Data analysis was guided by a framework that conceptualises governance as a series of principal-agent relations between state actors, citizens and health providers. Special attention is paid to voice, answerability and enforceability as crucial components of accountability. Results: The analysis has provided insight into the challenges to different components making up an effective accountability relationship, such as an unclear mandate, the lack of channels for voice or insufficient resources to carry out a mandate. The findings highlight the weak position of health providers and citizens towards state actors and development agents in the under-resourced health system and authoritarian political context. Contestation over resources among local government actors, and informal tools for answerability and enforceability were found to play an important role in shaping actual accountability relations. These accountability relationships form a complex institutional web in which agents are subject to various accountability demands. Particularly health providers find themselves to be in this role, being held accountable by state actors, citizens and development agencies. The latter were found to have established parallel principal-agent relationships with health providers without much attention to the role of local state actors, or strengthening the short accountability route from citizens to providers. Conclusion: The study has provided insight into the complexity of local governance relations and constraints to formal accountability processes. This has underlined the importance of informal accountability tools and the political-economic context in shaping principal-agent relations. The study has served to demonstrate the use and limitations of agency theory in health governance analysis, and points to the importance of entrenched positions of power in local health systems.

Background Community health workers (CHWs) are crucial for increasing access to health services to communities. Due to decades of conflict and under-funding, access to health care in South Sudan remains severely limited. To improve equitable access to healthcare, the government has introduced “the Boma Health Initiative (BHI)”, a strategy to harmonise community health programmes across the country. In order to scale up the BHI, it is necessary to assess the recent CHW programmes and draw lessons for future implementation. This study aimed to explore the characteristics, barriers, and facilitators to the implementation of CHW interventions in South Sudan between 2011 and 2019. Methods The study used a qualitative approach drawing from 26 key informant interviews and a scoping review of 21 Health Pooled Fund (HPF) programme reports from October 2016 to June 2018 and policy documents from 2011 to 2019. The results were thematically analysed based on a conceptual framework on factors influencing the performance of CHWs. Results Funding of CHW programmes has come from international donors, channelled through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have implemented a variety of CHW programmes. Communities have been participating in the selection of voluntary CHWs, intervention areas, and occasionally in the supervision of activities performed by CHWs. The coordination mechanisms among stakeholders have been weak, leading to wastage and duplication of resources. Although training of CHWs is done, training duration was short, and refresher-trainings were rare. There were and still are disparities in the type of incentives provided to CHWs. Monitoring and supportive supervision activities have been insufficient; drug misuse and stock-outs were common. Conclusion Despite their challenges, CHW programmes can be implemented in conflict-affected South Sudan if the local human capital is leveraged and engaged by NGOs as implementing partners. Robust coordination efforts are required to build synergies among stakeholders for the effective implementation of the BHI strategy.

Background As performance-based financing (PBF) is increasingly implemented across sub-Saharan Africa, some authors have suggested that it could be a 'stepping stone' for health-system strengthening and broad health-financing reforms. However, so far, few studies have looked at whether and how PBF is aligned to and integrated with national health-financing strategies, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Objective This study attempts to address the existing research gap by exploring the role of PBF with reference to: (1) user fees/exemption policies and (2) basic packages of health services and benefit packages in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria. Methods The comparative case study is based on document review, key informant interviews and focus-group discussions with stakeholders at national and subnational levels. Results The findings highlight different experiences in terms of PBF's integration. Although (formal or informal) fee exemption or reduction practices exist in all settings, their implementation is not uniform and they are often introduced by external programmes, including PBF, in an uncoordinated and vertical fashion. Additionally, the degree to which PBF indicators lists are aligned to the national basic packages of health services varies across cases, and is influenced by factors such as funders' priorities and budgetary concerns. Conclusions Overall, we find that where national leadership is stronger, PBF is better integrated and more in line with the health-financing regulations and, during phases of acute crisis, can provide structure and organisation to the system. Where governmental stewardship is weaker, PBF may result in another parallel programme, potentially increasing fragmentation in health financing and inequalities between areas supported by different donors.