JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Boston University African Studies Center and Board of Trustees, Boston University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The International Journal of African Historical Studies. Much has been written about famine in Ethiopia, and the efforts of the United States to relieve it in 1974 and 1984.1 But those who have studied the subject acknowledge that famine has a long history in Ethiopia and that American aid to that country predated the famines of 1974 and 1984. The recurrence of famine in Ethiopia and the controversy over recent American responses to it demonstrate the need for a historical study of famine as an issue in U.S.-Ethiopian relations. Paradoxically, much of the existing research focuses on the famines of 1974 and 1984.2 The narrow foci of such analyses limit our understanding of famine in Ethiopia and how American and Ethiopian governments struggled to eradicate it.
This article deals with famine as an issue in U.S. relations with Ethiopia. It concentrates on the less-known famines that preceded the much-studied events of 1974 and 1984. It is an attempt to address one unresolved but important question: given the conventional view that the imperial Ethiopian government knew very little about events in rural Ethiopia and was usually misinformed by its officials about famine, what was the contribution of U.S.-Ethiopian relations, especially the security dimensions of that relationship, in shaping the ideology and politics of famine in Ethiopia?3The article argues that contrary to the conventional opinions, the imperial Ethiopian government (the IEG) was well aware of the outbreaks of famine in the Ethiopian empire and the precarious conditions in which the peasants lived. But the government pretended to be unaware of these problems. Instead, it chose to present Ethiopia as a bountiful nation capable of feeding itself and its neighbors. It did so * My thanks to Frank Chalk of Concordia University, Emmanuel Akyeampong of Harvard University, and the anonymous reviewers of the IJAHS for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions.
Abstract:This article analyzes the conflicting interpretations of famine, relief aid, development assistance, and human rights by the Ethiopian and American governments, and the complexity of each government's policy and motives. It argues that in the 1970s and 1980s, the Carter and Reagan administrations faced the moral and political dilemma of assisting people in Ethiopia who were in desperate need with-out strengthening the hostile Ethiopian government in the process. And the government of Ethiopia had to make the difficult choice of accepting American aid on American terms at a period in Ethiopian history when doing so was politically suicidal. That America provided the aid and Ethiopia accepted it exemplifies the conduct of international relations in which human dignity compels nations to accommodate one another even within the boundaries of their mutual antagonism.
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