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Almost universally, research and practice suggest that a brand that increases its product assortment, or variety, should benefit through increased market share. In this paper, we show this is not always the case. We introduce the construct “assortment type” and demonstrate that the effect of assortment size on brand share is systematically moderated by assortment type. We define an “alignable” assortment as a set of brand variants that differ along a single, compensatory dimension such that choosing from that assortment only requires within-attribute trade-offs. In contrast, we define a “nonalignable” assortment as a set of brand variants that simultaneously vary along multiple, noncompensatory dimensions, demanding between-attribute trade-offs. In turn, we argue that an alignable assortment can efficiently meet the diverse tastes of consumers, thereby increasing brand share, but that a nonalignable assortment increases both the cognitive effort and the potential for regret faced by a consumer, thereby decreasing brand share. We term this effect “overchoice.” Across three studies, we provide evidence of overchoice and tie the effect to the effort and regret brought about by nonalignability. In the process, we demonstrate that simplification of information presentation, reversibility of choice, and a reduction in underlying nonalignability serve to reduce or eliminate this effect.brand assortments, brand choice, decision making, product policy, variety

The sunk-cost effect, an irrational attention to non-recoverable past costs while making current decisions, has been documented widely in the domain of monetary costs. In this paper, I study the effect of past time investments on current decisions. In three experiments using choice situations, I demonstrate that the sunk-cost effect is not observed for past investments of time, but the effect reappears when the investments are expressed as monetary quantities. I further propose that this`pseudo-rationality' is due to the fact that individuals lack the ability to account for time in the same way as they account for money. In two additional experiments, I facilitate the accounting of time and show that the irrational sunk-cost effect reappears. In a ®nal experiment, I test my propositions in a setting where subjects make real investments of time and subsequently make real choices.

Both authors contributed equally to the research reported in this article. The authors thank Chris Hsee, Luc Wathieu, and the four anonymous JMR reviewers for their comments on previous drafts of this article. They also thank Julien Cayla, Kareen Kinzli, and Michael Walker for their assistance in data collection. The studies reported in this article were conducted while Soman was at the College of Business, University of Colorado at Boulder, and that university's support is acknowledged.