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Abstract. Research on venture capital (VC) internationalization has expanded rapidly over the last decade. This paper reviews the extant literature on VC internationalization and highlights gaps in our knowledge. We identify three major research streams within this literature, which revolve around the following questions: (1) which VC firms invest across borders and what countries do they target; (2) how do VC firms address liabilities of foreign investing; and (3) what are the real effects of international VC investments? We provide an overview of the contributions in these research streams, discuss the role of public policy, and suggest avenues for future research. Specifically, we call for a deeper understanding of: (1) the functioning and impact of VC firms' modes of internationalization; (2) micro-level processes such as the functioning and decision making of international investment committees, or the development of international human and social capital; (3) the role of country institutions in VC internationalization and its real effects; and (4) the interplay of international VC with alternative financing sources.

Drawing upon an escalation of commitment framework, this study investigates how differences between cross-border and domestic venture capital investors in emotional, social, and institutional factors affect their decision to terminate an unsuccessful investment. We track the exit outcome of 1060 venture capital investments in 684 European technology companies. Results show that domestic investors have a high tendency to escalate their commitment to a failing course of action, while cross-border investors terminate their investments efficiently, even when investing through a local branch. This is explained by cross-border investors having a lower social and emotional involvement with the project and a lower embeddedness in the local economic and social environment, decreasing individual decision biases. Further, they are affected to a lower extent by normative pressures to further invest from their co-investment network. Local branches of cross-border investors are also shielded from escalation of commitment. We conjecture that their international investment committee acts as an organizational safeguard against individual decision biases. Domestic investors may hence benefit from mimicking the behavior of cross-border investors

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