Abstract. A theory of existence and uniqueness is developed for general stochastic differential mean field games with common noise. The concepts of strong and weak solutions are introduced in analogy with the theory of stochastic differential equations, and existence of weak solutions for mean field games is shown to hold under very general assumptions. Examples and counterexamples are provided to enlighten the underpinnings of the existence theory. Finally, an analog of the famous result of Yamada and Watanabe is derived, and it is used to prove existence and uniqueness of a strong solution under additional assumptions.
Mean field games are studied by means of the weak formulation of stochastic
optimal control. This approach allows the mean field interactions to enter
through both state and control processes and take a form which is general
enough to include rank and nearest-neighbor effects. Moreover, the data may
depend discontinuously on the state variable, and more generally its entire
history. Existence and uniqueness results are proven, along with a procedure
for identifying and constructing distributed strategies which provide
approximate Nash equlibria for finite-player games. Our results are applied to
a new class of multi-agent price impact models and a class of flocking models
for which we prove existence of equilibria
Abstract. The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may be asymmetric and based on full information. It is shown that approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games admit certain weak limits as n tends to infinity, and every limit is a weak solution of the mean field game (MFG). Conversely, every weak MFG solution can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games. Thus, the MFG precisely characterizes the possible limiting equilibrium behavior of the n-player games. Even in the setting without common noise, the empirical state distributions may admit stochastic limits which cannot be described by the usual notion of MFG solution.
Abstract. Mean field games are studied in the framework of controlled martingale problems, and general existence theorems are proven in which the equilibrium control is Markovian. The framework is flexible enough to include degenerate volatility, which may depend on both the control and the mean field. The objectives need not be strictly convex, and the mean field interactions considered are nonlocal and Wasserstein-continuous. When the volatility is nondegenerate, continuity assumptions may be weakened considerably. The proofs first use relaxed controls to establish existence. Then, using a convexity assumption and measurable selection arguments, strict (non-relaxed) Markovian equilibria are constructed from relaxed equilibria.
We analyze a family of portfolio management problems under relative performance criteria, for fund managers having CARA or CRRA utilities and trading in a common investment horizon in log‐normal markets. We construct explicit constant equilibrium strategies for both the finite population games and the corresponding mean field games, which we show are unique in the class of constant equilibria. In the CARA case, competition drives agents to invest more in the risky asset than they would otherwise, while in the CRRA case competitive agents may over‐ or underinvest, depending on their levels of risk tolerance.
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