Do the ''shaming'' activities of HROs (human rights international non-governmental organizations) have a direct influence on state behavior? We argue, consistent with existing scholarship, that states targeted or ''shamed'' by these organizations do improve their human rights practices. However, mere shaming is not enough. Improvements in human rights practices result from the interaction of shaming by HROs with (i) a domestic presence of HROs within the targeted state and ⁄ or (ii) pressure by third-party states, individuals, and organizations. Using a new data set of the shaming events of more than 400 HROs toward governments, we test these propositions quantitatively and find widespread support for the arguments. This research provides the first global quantitative evidence of the conditional importance of HRO shaming in transnational advocacy efforts.

The proposition that domestic political vulnerability provides an incentive for leaders to engage in international conflict has been widely accepted because of appealing logic and anecdotal support. Although empirical studies of U.S. behavior during the cold war era have demonstrated some support for a relationship between domestic political vulnerability and aggressive international behavior, the generalizability of these tests should not be assumed. In fact, there is little empirical evidence in support of this relationship as a general pattern. This study assesses theories linking domestic political vulnerability to international disputes on a cross-national basis by examining the relationships between economic decline, the electroal cycle, and measures of aggressive international action for 18 advanced industrialized democracies during the period from 1952 to 1988. The authors find no consistent support for a relationship between constraining domestic political conditions and international behavior. Instead, fewer international demands are made on politically vulnerable leaders. Due to strategic interaction in the international system, just when a state leader might be most willing to act aggressively, he or she is likely to have the least opportunity to do so. Variance in the behavior of international rivals may explain the lack of an empirical relationship between domestic political conditions and foreign policy behavior.

Immanuel Kant believed that democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and organizations could establish the foundations for “perpetual peace.” Our analyses of politically relevant dyads show that each of the three elements of the Kantian peace makes a statistically significant, independent contribution to peaceful interstate relations. These benefits are evident even when the influence of other theoretically interesting factors—such as relative power, alliances, geographic contiguity, and economic growth—is held constant. Increasing the number of shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) by one standard deviation reduces the incidence of militarized disputes by about 23 percent from the baseline rate for a typical pair of bordering states. If both members of a dyad are democratic, conflict is 35 percent less likely than the baseline; increasing both the dyadic trade–GDP ratio and the trend in trade by a standard deviation reduces the chance of conflict by 38 percent. Together, all the Kantian variables lower the probability of a dispute by 72 percent. We check for reverse causation and find reason to believe that a feedback system is at work, with IGOs reducing conflict and low-conflict dyads joining IGOs. Democracies and interdependent states are more likely to join IGOs with one another, bringing together the three elements of a system for Kantian peace.

This article investigates the influence of transnational ethnic alliances on the international interactions of states. Transnational ethnic alliances exist when both states in a dyad contain members of the same ethnic group. We argue that two types of dyads will experience higher levels of conflict than other dyads: (1) those where an advantaged minority in state A has an ethnic tie to a nonadvantaged minority in state B, and (2) those with a transnational ethnic alliance where the group in one of the states is politically mobilized. Using data from the COPDAB, Minorities at Risk, Polity II, COW, and Penn World Tables projects we find support for these contentions.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. W A e -examine the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth in the United States from 1948 to 1990, in order to gauge the potential peace dividend. Our main results suggest that military spending is a significant drain on the economy. We then examine the implications of a restructured international system for U.S. military expenditures and their resultant impact on economic growth in the 1990s. Simulations of Democratic and Republican proposals for cuts in defense spending suggest increases in economic output of between 2.5% and 4.5% over the period 1993-96.With cold-war expenditure no longer needed, our gigantic government expenditures abroad could be reduced and our international deficit would probably disappear almost overnight. With the dollar no longer overvalued, militant expansion of monetary and credit policy could stimulate capital formation, [or investment,] to utilize the resources released from armament production.... America's potential and actual growth rate, far from depending upon war preparations, would be markedly increased by an end to the cold war.Paul Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis T he recent collapse of the Soviet Union has opened the door for a reconsideration of the role and obligation of the United States in a post-cold war international system. As Paul Kennedy argued, the United States has been on the horns of a dilemma (1987, 532-35). It has extensive political commitments that "require" large resource commitments to the military. At the same time, (relative) industrial decline, coupled with the twin problems of massive external and internal debt have all suggested the economic "fall" of the United States, particularly in terms of declining competitiveness and stagnating economic growth. Furthermore, the increased levels of economic activity and economic productivity of Europe, as well as Asia, have made the commercial world increasingly competitive. The dilemma has the potential of being resolved, however, as diminished military threat poses an opportunity for restructuring U.S. military commitments.Concurrent with the relative decline of U.S. economic health has been the elimination of the major military threat to the United States. This has brought about significant restructuring of U.S. military policy away from stability based on nuclear deterrence. What will replace the bipolar balance of terror is at present unclear, but it is clear that the total threat to the United States has diminished in remarkable ways over the last few years. This dramatically reduced threat has led to widespread agreement that a rethinking of U.S. defense policy is required. Many have called for a significant downsizing of the U.S. mi...