In the first months of 2011, Internet communications were disrupted in several North African countries in response to civilian protests and threats of civil war. In this paper we analyze episodes of these disruptions in two countries: Egypt and Libya. Our analysis relies on multiple sources of large-scale data already available to academic researchers: BGP interdomain routing control plane data; unsolicited data plane traffic to unassigned address space; active macroscopic traceroute measurements; RIR delegation files; and MaxMind's geolocation database. We used the latter two data sets to determine which IP address ranges were allocated to entities within each country, and then mapped these IP addresses of interest to BGP-announced address ranges (prefixes) and origin ASes using publicly available BGP data repositories in the U.S. and Europe. We then analyzed observable activity related to these sets of prefixes and ASes throughout the censorship episodes. Using both control plane and data plane data sets in combination allowed us to narrow down which forms of Internet access disruption were implemented in a given region over time. Among other insights, we detected what we believe were Libya's attempts to test firewall-based blocking before they executed more aggressive BGP-based disconnection. Our methodology could be used, and automated, to detect outages or similar macroscopically disruptive events in other geographic or topological regions.

Abstract. We study a geometric representation problem, where we are given a set B of axis-aligned rectangles (boxes) with fixed dimensions and a graph with vertex set B. The task is to place the rectangles without overlap such that two rectangles touch if the graph contains an edge between them. We call this problem CONTACT REPRESENTATION OF WORD NETWORKS (CROWN). It formalizes the geometric problem behind drawing word clouds in which semantically related words are close to each other. Here, we represent words by rectangles and semantic relationships by edges. We show that CROWN is strongly NP-hard even if restricted to trees and weakly NP-hard if restricted to stars. We also consider the optimization problem MAX-CROWN where each adjacency induces a certain profit and the task is to maximize the sum of the profits. For this problem, we present constant-factor approximations for several graph classes, namely stars, trees, planar graphs, and graphs of bounded degree. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms experimentally and show that our best method improves upon the best existing heuristic by 45%.

Abstract. A point set P ⊆ R 2 is universal for a class G if every graph of G has a planar straight-line embedding into P . We prove that there exists a O(n( log n log log n ) 2 ) size universal point set for the class of simply-nested n-vertex planar graphs. This is a step towards a full answer for the well-known open problem on the size of the smallest universal point sets for planar graphs [1,5,9].

In the first months of 2011, Internet communications were disrupted in several North African countries in response to civilian protests and threats of civil war. In this paper we analyze episodes of these disruptions in two countries: Egypt and Libya. Our analysis relies on multiple sources of large-scale data already available to academic researchers: BGP interdomain routing control plane data; unsolicited data plane traffic to unassigned address space; active macroscopic traceroute measurements; RIR delegation files; and MaxMind's geolocation database. We used the latter two data sets to determine which IP address ranges were allocated to entities within each country, and then mapped these IP addresses of interest to BGP-announced address ranges (prefixes) and origin ASes using publicly available BGP data repositories in the U.S. and Europe. We then analyzed observable activity related to these sets of prefixes and ASes throughout the censorship episodes. Using both control plane and data plane data sets in combination allowed us to narrow down which forms of Internet access disruption were implemented in a given region over time. Among other insights, we detected what we believe were Libya's attempts to test firewallbased blocking before they executed more aggressive BGP-based disconnection. Our methodology could be used, and automated, to detect outages or similar macroscopically disruptive events in other geographic or topological regions.

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