This study shows that, in an unregulated fee-setting environment, specialist physicians practise price discrimination on the basis of their patients' income status. Our results are consistent with profit maximisation behaviour by specialists. These findings are based on a large population survey that is linked to administrative medical claims records. We find that, for an initial consultation, specialist physicians charge their high-income patients AU$26 more than their low-income patients. While this gap equates to a 19% lower fees for the poorest patients (bottom 25% of the household income distribution), it is unlikely to remove the substantial financial barriers they face in accessing specialist care. There are large variations across specialties, with neurologists exhibiting the largest fee gap between the high-income and low-income patients. Several possible channels for deducing the patient's income are examined. We find that patient characteristics such as age, health concession card status and private health insurance status are all used by specialists as proxies for income status. These characteristics are particularly important to further practise price discrimination among the low-income patients but are less relevant for the high-income patients. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Background Understanding the important factors for choosing a general practitioner (GP) can inform the provision of consumer information and contribute to the design of primary care services.

No abstract

After a period of steady decline, out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for general practitioner (GP) consultations in Australia began increasing in the mid-1990s. Following the rising community concerns about the increasing costs, the Australian Government introduced the Strengthening Medicare reforms in 2004 and 2005, which included a targeted incentive for GPs to charge zero OOP costs for consultations provided to children and concession cardholders (older adults and the poor), as well as an increase in the reimbursement for all GP visits. This paper examines the impact of those reforms using longitudinal survey and administrative data from a large national sample of women. The findings suggest that the reforms were effective in reducing OOP costs by an average of $A0.40 per visit. Decreases in OOP costs, however, were not evenly distributed. Those with higher pre-reform OOP costs had the biggest reductions in OOP costs, as did those with concession cards. However, results also reveal increases in OOP costs for most people without a concession card. The analysis suggests that there has been considerable heterogeneity in GP responses to the reforms, which has led to substantial changes in the fees charged by doctors and, as a result, the OOP costs incurred by different population groups. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.