Background: The risk of environmental contamination by SARS-CoV-2 in the intensive care unit (ICU) is unclear. We aimed to evaluate the extent of environmental contamination in the ICU and correlate this with patient and disease factors, including the impact of different ventilatory modalities. Methods: Observational study where surface environmental samples collected from ICU patient rooms and common areas were tested by SARS-CoV-2 PCR, with select samples from the common area tested on cell culture. Clinical data were collected and correlated to presence of environmental contamination. Results were compared to historical data from a previous study in general wards (GW). Results: 200 samples from 20 patient rooms, and 75 samples from common areas and the staff pantry, were tested. 14 rooms had at least one site contaminated, with an overall contamination rate of 14% (28 of 200 samples). Environmental contamination was not associated with day of illness, ventilatory mode, aerosol generating procedures, or viral load. There was lower frequency of environmental contamination in ICU compared to GW rooms. Eight samples from the common area were positive, though all were negative on cell culture. Conclusion: Environmental contamination in the ICU is lower compared to the GW. Use of mechanical ventilation or high-flow nasal oxygen was not associated with greater surface contamination, supporting their use and safety from an infection control perspective. Transmission risk via environmental surfaces in the ICUs is likely to be low. Nonetheless, infection control practices should be strictly reinforced, and transmission risk via droplet or airborne spread remains.

Background: Understanding the extent of aerosol-based transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is important for tailoring interventions for control of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Multiple studies have reported the detection of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid in air samples, but only one study has successfully recovered viable virus, although it is limited by its small sample size. Objective: We aimed to determine the extent of shedding of viable SARS-CoV-2 in respiratory aerosols from COVID-19 patients. Methods: In this observational air sampling study, air samples from airborne-infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) and a community isolation facility (CIF) housing COVID-19 patients were collected using a water vapor condensation method into liquid collection media. Samples were tested for presence of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid using quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR), and qRT-PCR-positive samples were tested for viability using viral culture. Results: Samples from 6 (50%) of the 12 sampling cycles in hospital rooms were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA, including aerosols ranging from <1 µm to >4 µm in diameter. Of 9 samples from the CIF, 1 was positive via qRT-PCR. Viral RNA concentrations ranged from 179 to 2,738 ORF1ab gene copies per cubic meter of air. Virus cultures were negative after 4 blind passages. Conclusion: Although SARS-CoV-2 is readily captured in aerosols, virus culture remains challenging despite optimized sampling methodologies to preserve virus viability. Further studies on aerosol-based transmission and control of SARS-CoV-2 are needed.

BackgroundFrom 31 August to 9 September 2015, a total of 150 military personnel at a military institution in Singapore were infected with acute gastroenteritis (AGE) with an attack rate of approximately 3%. This study aimed to determine the epidemiology of the outbreak, investigate its origins, and discuss measures to prevent future occurrences.MethodsAfter the AGE outbreak was declared on 31 August 2015, symptom surveys, hygiene inspections, and the testing of water, food, and stool samples were initiated. We collected 86 stool samples from AGE cases and 58 samples from food-handlers during the course of the outbreak and these stool samples were tested for 8 bacterial pathogens and 2 viral pathogens (i.e., norovirus and sapovirus).ResultsWe detected Sapovirus (SaV), group I Norovirus (NoV GI) and group II Norovirus (NoV GII) from the stool samples of AGE cases. Further sequence analyses showed that the AGE outbreak in August was caused mainly by three rarely reported calicivirus novel genotypes: NoV GI.7, NoV GII.17 and SaV GII.3. Control measures implemented focused on the escalation of personal and environmental hygiene, which included the separation of affected and unaffected soldiers, enforcement of rigorous hand-washing and hygiene, raising awareness of food and water safety, and disinfection of communal areas with bleach.ConclusionsThis study identified both NoV and SaV as the causative agents for an AGE outbreak at a Singapore military camp in August 2015. This study is also the first to report SaV as one of the main causative agents, highlighting the importance of caliciviruses as causative agents of AGE outbreaks in the Singapore military. As there are no commercially available vaccines against caliciviruses, strict personal hygiene and proper disinfection of environmental surfaces remain crucial to prevent calicivirus outbreak and transmission.

Differences observed highlight difficulties in controlling person-to-person outbreaks among large groups in close proximity (e.g., military trainees). Distinct differences in antigenic sites may have contributed to increased immunological susceptibility of the soldiers to infection.

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