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Scientific evaluation of the competitiveness of China’s dairy industry is of great significance to the development of regional dairy industry. In view of the fact that the existing evaluation model cannot solve the dynamic nonlinear optimization problem, this paper established a projection pursuit model based on accelerating genetic algorithm and carried on the comprehensive evaluation and dynamic analysis on the competitiveness of dairy industry in China’s 31 provinces and cities (not including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) from five dimensions, namely, basic factors of production, the industry demand conditions, the enterprise competitiveness and growth force, related and supporting industries, and the natural environmental elements. It was found that firstly, from the perspective of time, the development trend of China’s dairy industry basically shows a positive trend. With the improvement of national living standards, the competitiveness of the dairy industry is also constantly improved. Secondly, from the perspective of space, regional differences in the competitiveness of the dairy industry are significant. Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Shandong, and Hebei are at the forefront of the development of the industry, while the development of the dairy industry in the rest of the region has a big gap with those areas. From the perspective of regional layout, the advantageous region of China’s dairy industry has been preliminarily formed, and the competitive advantage is mainly concentrated in the northern region. Accordingly, the countermeasures and suggestions to enhance the competitiveness of China’s dairy industry were put forward.

By constructing an evolutionary game model of green dairy industry chain from the perspective of green sustainable development, this paper analyzed the evolution process of strategy selection of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises under the supervision of the government. The study found the following. (1) In the absence of supervision, even if the initial cooperation willingness of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises is strong, once the additional cost of their input of “green production” is less than the additional benefit, they will eventually choose noncooperative strategy. (2) In the case of government supervision, when the government punishment or subsidy is not strong enough, the strategic choice of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises will fluctuate repeatedly, and the game equilibrium cannot be reached. However, when the government punishments and subsidies are strong enough, dairy farmers and dairy enterprises will choose to cooperate in their own interests. At this time, government subsidies have a greater impact on the evolution of bilateral cooperation than government punishments. (3) The reduction of green production cost can promote the formation of the green dairy industry chain, which is conducive to the green dairy industry chain system to achieve an ideal equilibrium state.