Disease in the mother and aunt probably resulted from person-to-person transmission of this lethal avian influenzavirus during unprotected exposure to the critically ill index patient.

Avian influenza viruses preferentially recognize sialosugar chains terminating in sialic acid-␣2,3-galactose (SA␣2,3Gal), whereas human influenza viruses preferentially recognize SA␣2,6Gal. A conversion to SA␣2,6Gal specificity is believed to be one of the changes required for the introduction of new hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes to the human population, which can lead to pandemics. Avian influenza H5N1 virus is a major threat for the emergence of a pandemic virus. As of 12 June 2007, the virus has been reported in 45 countries, and 312 human cases with 190 deaths have been confirmed. We describe here substitutions at position 129 and 134 identified in a virus isolated from a fatal human case that could change the receptor-binding preference of HA of H5N1 virus from SA␣2,3Gal to both SA␣2,3Gal and SA␣2,6Gal. Molecular modeling demonstrated that the mutation may stabilize SA␣2,6Gal in its optimal cis conformation in the binding pocket. The mutation was found in approximately half of the viral sequences directly amplified from a respiratory specimen of the patient. Our data confirm the presence of H5N1 virus with the ability to bind to a human-type receptor in this patient and suggest the selection and expansion of the mutant with human-type receptor specificity in the human host environment.

BackgroundIndividuals infected with the 2009 pandemic virus A(H1N1) developed serological response which can be measured by hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) and microneutralization (microNT) assays.Methodology/Principal FindingsMicroNT and HI assays for specific antibody to the 2009 pandemic virus were conducted in serum samples collected at the end of the first epidemic wave from various groups of Thai people: laboratory confirmed cases, blood donors and health care workers (HCW) in Bangkok and neighboring province, general population in the North and the South, as well as archival sera collected at pre- and post-vaccination from vaccinees who received influenza vaccine of the 2006 season. This study demonstrated that goose erythrocytes yielded comparable HI antibody titer as compared to turkey erythrocytes. In contrast to the standard protocol, our investigation found out the necessity to eliminate nonspecific inhibitor present in the test sera by receptor destroying enzyme (RDE) prior to performing microNT assay. The investigation in pre-pandemic serum samples showed that HI antibody was more specific to the 2009 pandemic virus than NT antibody. Based on data from pre-pandemic sera together with those from the laboratory confirmed cases, HI antibody titers ≥40 for adults and ≥20 for children could be used as the cut-off level to differentiate between the individuals with or without past infection by the 2009 pandemic virus.Conclusions/SignificanceBased on the cut-off criteria, the infection rates of 7 and 12.8% were estimated in blood donors and HCW, respectively after the first wave of the 2009 influenza pandemic. Among general population, the infection rate of 58.6% was found in children versus 3.1% in adults.

Thailand reported the first Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) case on 18 June 2015 (day 4) in an Omani patient with heart condition who was diagnosed with pneumonia on hospital admission on 15 June 2015 (day 1). Two false negative RT-PCR on upper respiratory tract samples on days 2 and 3 led to a 48-hour diagnosis delay and a decision to transfer the patient out of the negative pressure unit (NPU). Subsequent examination of sputum later on day 3 confirmed MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection. The patient was immediately moved back into the NPU and then transferred to Bamrasnaradura Infectious Disease Institute. Over 170 contacts were traced; 48 were quarantined and 122 self-monitored for symptoms. High-risk close contacts exhibiting no symptoms, and whose laboratory testing on the 12th day after exposure was negative, were released on the 14th day. The Omani Ministry of Health (MOH) was immediately notified using the International Health Regulation (IHR) mechanism. Outbreak investigation was conducted in Oman, and was both published on the World Health Organization (WHO) intranet and shared with Thailand’s IHR focal point. The key to successful infection control, with no secondary transmission, were the collaborative efforts among hospitals, laboratories and MOHs of both countries.