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Both advocates and opponents of retrenchment have treated it as an undesirable, last-ditch strategy for states that have already experienced severe decline. This article presents a formal model that identifies an unrecognized benefit of retrenchment: It can provide declining states with valuable information about rising states' future intentions. By removing constraints over the behavior of rising states in a particular region, a declining state can induce hostile risers to attempt revision of the regional order. This, in turn, makes a riser's cooperative behavior more credible as a signal of benign intentions, allowing the decliner to oppose hostile types while accommodating benign ones. In contrast to the existing focus on retrenchment as a desperate strategy taken from a position of weakness, this article suggests that the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest when it is undertaken early, from a position of strength.

IN HIS SEMINAL WORK Domination and the Arts of Resistance, James Scott shows how groups in subordinate power relationships, such as slaves, are often unable to express their dissatisfaction with the actions of a dominant group overtly. 1 This constitutes proscribed discourse, or statements that would incur punishment if observed by the dominant group. Instead, Scott argues, dissatisfied subordinates maintain "hidden transcripts"-covert communications among themselves that are opaque to the dominant group-to effectively coordinate challenges to the status quo in secret. Such communications entail culturally informed symbols

How can declining states reliably infer the intentions of rising states? One prominent line of argument maintains that because declining states face intractable uncertainty about rising states’ future intentions, preventive war is often unavoidable even between states with truly compatible goals. This article presents a dynamic model of reassurance in which actors are uncertain whether or not their interests conflict. The model shows that by adopting a hedging strategy of limited containment short of war, declining states can reduce risers’ incentives to send dishonest cooperative signals. This, in turn, makes cooperation more credible as a signal of risers’ benign intentions. Moreover, these signals are sufficiently informative to dissuade the decliner from escalating to preventive war even under large power shifts. Thus, although power shifts promote limited competition among states with compatible goals, preventive war rationally occurs only in a bargaining context when the riser’s goals are known to be incompatible.

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It has been widely noted that China and Russia have grown progressively closer over the last two decades. Although the scholarly literature has offered detailed descriptions and various ad hoc explanations of this trend, the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship has been the subject of very little scrutiny using rigorous theory, which has obstructed hypothesis formation and evaluation. Moreover, the cooperative post-Cold War trend in the bilateral relationship seems puzzling for baseline versions of each of the major paradigms of international relations theory: realism, constructivism and liberalism. For realists, China's rising power, coupled with its geographic proximity and longstanding border disputes with Russia, made it a present and growing threat to Russian security at the end of the Cold War. Why did China's rise not incur balancing from Russia and increasing bilateral hostility, rather than reconciliation? For constructivists, the stark differences in political ideologies and national cultures, as well as a long history of antagonism, presaged continued post-Cold War animosity. How have these historical animosities and ideological rifts been mitigated or overcome? Finally, both countries were increasingly integrated into the US-led international order immediately following the Cold War, with relatively low interdependence in their bilateral relationship. From a liberal perspective, why did this not prompt the two countries to improve political relations with the West while holding each other at arm's length? The papers in this special issue develop and apply nuanced theoretical arguments to derive testable hypotheses for the cooperative trend in China-Russia relations. In contrast to existing scholarship, these papers offer generalizable insights that both improve our understanding of a crucially important contemporary case, while also advancing IR theory in substantial ways.

One of the most intractable debates in IR revolves around the severity and frequency of the security dilemma. Offensive realists argue that states are compelled to make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, which yields inexorable competition and conflict even between mutually-benign actors. Yet others have argued that rational benign states should always be able to find cooperative signals that are costly enough to be credible, but not too costly to risk sending. If true, this should alleviate the security dilemma and facilitate cooperation, even under high initial distrust. However, there is little empirical work on interstate reassurance and the conditions under which mutually-benign actors can build trust. We address this gap using laboratory experiments to test Andrew Kydd’s canonical model of the security dilemma. We find strong support for the directional effects of the hypothesized signaling mechanisms. However, the frequency of cooperation is significantly lower than the model predicts, and the feasibility of reassurance is highly sensitive to the degree of prior trust. This implies that although reassurance can mitigate the security dilemma, offensive realism may still capture important psychological mechanisms that impede interstate cooperation.