This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through sidechannels that relate to control flow and data flow. To eliminate key-dependent control flow and key-dependent timing behavior related to control flow, we propose the use of if-conversion in a compiler backend, and evaluate a proof-of-concept prototype implementation. Furthermore, we demonstrate two ways in which programs that lack key-dependent control flow and keydependent cache behavior can still leak timing information on modern x86 implementations such as the Intel Core 2 Duo, and propose defense mechanisms against them.

In recent years there has been an increasing trend toward the incorpor ation of computers into a variety of devices where the amount of memory available is limited. This makes it desirable to try to reduce the size of applications where possible. This article explores the use of compiler techniques to accomplish code compaction to yield smaller executables. The main contribution of this article is to show that careful, aggressive, interprocedural optimization, together with procedural abstraction of repeated code fragments, can yield significantly better reductions in code size than previous approaches, which have generally focused on abstraction of repeated instruction sequences. We also show how “equivalent” code fragments can be detected and factored out using conventional compiler techniques, and without having to resort to purely linear treatments of code sequences as in suffix-tree-based approaches, thereby setting up a framework for code compaction that can be more flexible in its treatment of what code fragments are considered equivalent. Our ideas have been implemented in the form of a binary-rewriting tool that reduces the size of executables by about 30% on the average.

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Small program size is an important requirement for embedded systems with limited amounts of memory. We describe how link-time compaction through binary rewriting can achieve code size reductions of up to 62% for statically bound languages such as C, C++, and Fortran, without compromising on performance. We demonstrate how the limited amount of information about a program at link time can be exploited to overcome overhead resulting from separate compilation. This is done with scalable, cost-effective, whole-program analyses, optimizations, and duplicate code and data elimination techniques. The discussed techniques are evaluated and their cost-effectiveness is quantified with SQUEEZE++, a prototype link-time compactor.