ObjectiveThe relationship between sex/gender differences and autism has attracted a variety of research ranging from clinical and neurobiological to etiological, stimulated by the male bias in autism prevalence. Findings are complex and do not always relate to each other in a straightforward manner. Distinct but interlinked questions on the relationship between sex/gender differences and autism remain underaddressed. To better understand the implications from existing research and to help design future studies, we propose a 4-level conceptual framework to clarify the embedded themes.MethodWe searched PubMed for publications before September 2014 using search terms “‘sex OR gender OR females’ AND autism.” A total of 1,906 articles were screened for relevance, along with publications identified via additional literature reviews, resulting in 329 articles that were reviewed.ResultsLevel 1, “Nosological and diagnostic challenges,” concerns the question, “How should autism be defined and diagnosed in males and females?” Level 2, “Sex/gender-independent and sex/gender-dependent characteristics,” addresses the question, “What are the similarities and differences between males and females with autism?” Level 3, “General models of etiology: liability and threshold,” asks the question, “How is the liability for developing autism linked to sex/gender?” Level 4, “Specific etiological–developmental mechanisms,” focuses on the question, “What etiological–developmental mechanisms of autism are implicated by sex/gender and/or sexual/gender differentiation?”ConclusionsUsing this conceptual framework, findings can be more clearly summarized, and the implications of the links between findings from different levels can become clearer. Based on this 4-level framework, we suggest future research directions, methodology, and specific topics in sex/gender differences and autism.

Autobiographical descriptions and clinician observations suggest that some individuals with autism, particularly females, ‘camouflage’ their social communication difficulties, which may require considerable cognitive effort and lead to increased stress, anxiety and depression. Using data from 60 age- and IQ-matched men and women with autism (without intellectual disability), we operationalized camouflaging in adults with autism for the first time as the quantitative discrepancy between the person’s ‘external’ behavioural presentation in social–interpersonal contexts (measured by the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule) and the person’s ‘internal’ status (dispositional traits measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient and social cognitive capability measured by the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ Test). We found that the operationalized camouflaging measure was not significantly correlated with age or IQ. On average, women with autism had higher camouflaging scores than men with autism (Cohen’s d = 0.98), with substantial variability in both groups. Greater camouflaging was associated with more depressive symptoms in men and better signal-detection sensitivity in women with autism. The neuroanatomical association with camouflaging score was largely sex/gender-dependent and significant only in women: from reverse inference, the most correlated cognitive terms were about emotion and memory. The underlying constructs, measurement, mechanisms, consequences and heterogeneity of camouflaging in autism warrant further investigation.

The 'self' is a complex multidimensional construct deeply embedded and in many ways defined by our relations with the social world. Individuals with autism are impaired in both self-referential and other-referential social cognitive processing. Atypical neural representation of the self may be a key to understanding the nature of such impairments. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging we scanned adult males with an autism spectrum condition and age and IQ-matched neurotypical males while they made reflective mentalizing or physical judgements about themselves or the British Queen. Neurotypical individuals preferentially recruit the middle cingulate cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in response to self compared with other-referential processing. In autism, ventromedial prefrontal cortex responded equally to self and other, while middle cingulate cortex responded more to other-mentalizing than self-mentalizing. These atypical responses occur only in areas where self-information is preferentially processed and does not affect areas that preferentially respond to other-referential information. In autism, atypical neural self-representation was also apparent via reduced functional connectivity between ventromedial prefrontal cortex and areas associated with lower level embodied representations, such as ventral premotor and somatosensory cortex. Furthermore, the magnitude of neural self-other distinction in ventromedial prefrontal cortex was strongly related to the magnitude of early childhood social impairments in autism. Individuals whose ventromedial prefrontal cortex made the largest distinction between mentalizing about self and other were least socially impaired in early childhood, while those whose ventromedial prefrontal cortex made little to no distinction between mentalizing about self and other were the most socially impaired in early childhood. These observations reveal that the atypical organization of neural circuitry preferentially coding for self-information is a key mechanism at the heart of both self-referential and social impairments in autism.