Recent studies report an inability to replicate previously published research, leading some to suggest that scientific knowledge is facing a credibility crisis. In this essay, we provide evidence on whether strategic management research may itself be vulnerable to these concerns. We conducted a study whereby we attempted to reproduce the empirical findings of 88 articles appearing in the Strategic Management Journal using data reported in the articles themselves. About 70% of the studies did not disclose enough data to permit independent tests of reproducibility of their findings. Of those that could be retested, almost one-third reported hypotheses as statistically significant which were no longer so and far more significant results were found to be non-significant in the reproductions than in the opposite direction. Collectively, incomplete reporting practices, disclosure errors, and possible opportunism limit the reproducibility of most studies. Until disclosure standards and requirements change to include more complete reporting and facilitate tests of reproducibility, the strategic management field appears vulnerable to a credibility crisis.

The authors examine how strategy scholars have measured and tested industry effects. They report findings from three studies. First, they replicate the Dess, Ireland, and Hitt (1990) article on industry controls in strategic management research using a new sample of studies published during 2000 to 2009, finding that there has been a decrease in the proportion of articles that do not control for industry effects at all and at the same time noting a significant increase in the number of single-industry studies. Second, they employ a fine-grained content analysis of articles published in the Strategic Management Journal at three different points during the study period to identify the different ways that industry effects have been considered. Findings depict a myriad of highly diverse industry-level measures that researchers have applied. Third, they test the empirical implications of applying different measures of one particular industry characteristic, industry performance. They demonstrate that empirical findings and the interpretation of theoretical models can differ based on how industry effects are incorporated. Recommendations are offered for guiding future research about how to examine industry effects.

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Recently, outside blockholders, external owners that hold 5% or more of their firms’ outstanding common stockholdings, have been pressuring their firms to engage in divestiture activities. This study considers whether the influence of those owners also extends to how the divestiture is implemented, whether through spin-off or sell-off. Tests of an agency theory model using data from 205 divestitures show that the adoption of spin-offs or sell-offs is associated with the amount of outstanding common stockholdings held by outside blockholders and the size of the unit divested. Spin-offs are used more frequently when outside blockholders own more of the divesting firm’s stockholdings and the divested unit is larger, while sell-offs tend to be selected when outside blockholders own less stock and the divested business is smaller. Consistent with agency theory expectations, spin-offs would allow the blockholders to decide whether to hold or sell their interests in the divested firm, a decision they could make in accordance with their individual portfolio risks. Sell-offs of small units could be used to preserve organizational diversity and produce proceeds that would help the divesting firm’s managers pursue their self-interests. Overall, outside blockholders appear to shape how divestitures are done, even if they cannot directly intervene in their firms’ operations.

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