Induced hypocrisy is a sequential, two-step, cognitive dissonance procedure that prompts individuals to adopt a proattitudinal behavior. The present meta-analysis of 29 published and nine unpublished induced-hypocrisy studies enabled us to test three key dissonance-related issues. First, is hypocrisy effective in promoting change in behavioral intention and behavior? Our analyses supported the idea that hypocrisy (vs. control) increased both behavioral intention and behavior. Second, does hypocrisy generate psychological discomfort? Results pertaining to this issue were inconclusive due to the small number of studies measuring psychological discomfort. Third, are both steps necessary to generate change? Effect sizes conform to the idea that the transgressions-only condition can increase both behavior and intention. Our meta-analysis raises a number of theoretical issues concerning the psychological processes underlying induced hypocrisy and highlights implications for practitioners.

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In a forced compliance situation, Scheier and Carver have shown that making high private self-consciousness salient through exposure to a mirror inhibits the arousal of dissonance and the subsequent attitude change. Based on these results, the aim of our study is to examine an alternate theoretical interpretation of the absence of attitude change. From our point of view, the mirror could have the status of a misattribution cue, thus maintaining the arousal. To test this hypothesis within the induced hypocrisy paradigm, participants first completed the private self-consciousness scale. Then they took part in one of the following conditions: (1) no mirror/no hypocrisy, (2) no mirror/hypocrisy, and (3) mirror/hypocrisy. Behavioral change and psychological discomfort were measured. Results indicated that participants in the mirror/hypocrisy condition were the most inclined to change and reported the greatest psychological discomfort. These results revealed that participants experienced dissonance when exposed to the mirror and support the hypothesis of misattribution.

Our main purpose was to explore hypotheses derived from the Identification of Action Theory in a particular situation that is, a dissonant situation. Thus, we varied the identification (low versus high-level) of a problematic behavior (to stop speaking for 24 hours) in the forced compliance paradigm. Two modes of dissonance reduction were presented: cognitive rationalization (classical attitude-change) and behavioral rationalization (target behavior: to stop speaking for 48 hours). As predicted, the results showed that high-level identity of action leads to cognitive rationalization whereas low-level identity leads to behavioural rationalization. Thus, participants identifying the problematic behavior at a low-level were more inclined to accept the target behavior, compared with participants identifying their problematic behavior at a higher-level. These results are of particular interest for understanding the extent to which the understanding of the discrepant act interferes with the cognitive processes of dissonance reduction.

The aim of the two studies was to explore a new dissonance paradigm-expressive dissonance-based on the inconsistency between what people feel and what people express behaviorally. Expressive dissonance was aroused by asking participants to watch a film with a high emotional content, either positive (joy) or negative (sadness). In the no-dissonance condition, they received the instruction to naturally watch the film. In the expressive dissonance condition, they received the instruction to facially express emotions that were the opposite of what they felt. We expected that the expressive dissonance situation would: 1) require cognitive resources leading to a decrease in cognitive performance (studies 1 and 2); 2) be accompanied by emotional regulation strategies (study 1); 3) be accompanied by an increase in dissonance-related affects (study 2). Although our results (studies 1 and 2) corroborated those obtained previously in terms of performance, they also showed that participants in the expressive dissonance situation use emotional regulation strategies: exaggeration and suppression (study 1), and that they felt self-directed negative affects (study 2), just like the participants in a cognitive dissonance situation. These first results allowed us to establish a theoretical bridge between the theories of emotions-particularly those related to the emotional regulation processes-and to widen the scope of relevance of the dissonance theory.