No serious complications occurred after 27 CT-guided radiofrequency ablation sessions in 22 patients. In total, no residual tumor was detected on follow-up contrast-enhanced CT or MRI 1-35 months (mean, 7 months) after final tumor ablation in 20 (91%) of 22 patients. Two patients with residual viable tumor deferred further treatment. Complete tumor ablation was achieved after a single treatment session in 83% of patients, and in 8% of patients after subsequent ablation sessions. Size was the major determinant for achieving tumor eradication with a single session of ablation, with all 11 tumors 3 cm or smaller being completely ablated after one session. Tumor location, histology, and the presence of renal disease did not correlate with treatment success. Contrast-enhanced CT performed immediately after ablation is reliable to exclude residual viable tumor. CT-guided radiofrequency ablation of renal tumors is safe and has a high rate of success in the treatment of small renal tumors, with no evidence of recurrence at midterm follow-up of treated patients.

This study tested for inter-judge agreement on moral character. A sample of students and community members rated their own moral character using a measure that tapped six moral character traits. Friends, family members, and/or acquaintances rated these targets on the same traits. Self/other and inter-informant agreement was found at the trait level for both a general character factor and for residual variance explained by individual moral character traits, as well as the individual level (judges agreed on targets' "moral character profiles"). Observed inter-judge agreement constitutes evidence for the existence of moral character, and raises questions about the nature of moral character traits.

We investigate the long-standing yet understudied assumption that feeling moral is a basic psychological need, perhaps like the needs to feel autonomous, competent, and related (ACR). We report an empirical "entrance exam" on whether morality should be considered a need. Specifically, we applied to morality a pioneering method from which Sheldon and colleagues provided evidence that ACR are basic psychological needs. In two studies and four samples, participants recalled events in which they felt un/satisfied, meaningful, pleasurable, at their best, and at their worst. They rated how much candidate psychological needs were satisfied during them. Morality was frequently as or more satisfied than ACR during peak events. Further, it was positively related to indices of positive functioning. These findings suggest feelings of being moral may help people identify times when life is going well. Further, they suggest that morality may be a fundamental psychological need and warrants further investigation.

Objective This work disentangles moral tolerance from moral relativism and reveals their distinct personological meanings. Both constructs have long been of interest to moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and everyday people, and they may play prominent roles in the feasibility of modern diverse societies. However, they have been criticized as devaluing morality and as producing overly permissive societies. Moreover, although they lack necessary conceptual implications for each other, they are easily (and often) conflated. Method Three studies included nine samples (total N > 3,200, 40%–50% female, Mage = 38–40, 83% white). Participants completed (online) new measures of moral tolerance and moral relativism, along with measures of 40 additional constructs. Results Results reveal robust psychometric quality of the new measures (the Moral Relativism Scale and the Moral Tolerance Scale), demonstrate that the constructs are empirically overlapping but separable, and highlight their distinct personological networks. Moral relativism was associated with liberal political views and a lowered valuing/enacting of moral values. Moral tolerance was weakly associated with liberal political views but was strongly related to a broad range of both liberal and conservative moral values. Conclusion This work yields new tools for investigating moral character, and it reveals the differential meaning of two important moral constructs.

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