Facing an increasing number and variety of issues with social salience, firms must determine how to engage with issues that likely have a significant impact on them. Integrating issues management (IM) and salience theories, the authors find that firms engage with socially contested issues—where there is a high degree of societal disagreement—in a different manner from issues that have social consensus, or high agreement. Examining social issue resolutions filed by shareholders from 1997 to 2009 (3,887 total observations), the study finds that socially contested issues, as well as those issues with social consensus, are both likely to result in engagement by the firm. For social issues with consensus, a firm is more likely to opt for a low level of shareholder engagement whereas resolutions regarding contested issues lead to engaging shareholders at a higher level. These findings shed new light on the IM and issue salience literature streams that have suggested firms will react differently to these types of issues, even while they remain largely untested. Finally, firms become less engaged with perennial issues over time. rather than more, providing new guidance to researchers, shareholder activists, and firms alike. To the authors’ knowledge, such fined-grained insight into expected levels of firm engagement with social issue salience has not been put forth previously.

Why do some firms engage in actions to reduce climate change? We propose two counterintuitive mechanisms: high levels of regulation and a firm's increased tolerance for risk. Drawing from insights on how institutional contexts constrain, and enable, prosocial firm behavior, we argue that external pressures, amplified internally by a firm's higher tolerance for risk, increase the likelihood that a greenhouse gas (GHG)-intensive firm will engage in climate change actions that exceed regulatory requirements. An analysis based on 7,101 observations of U.S. publicly traded firms during the 2013 to 2015 period supports our hypotheses. Our models show high overall prediction accuracy (88.6%) using an out-of-time holdout sample from 2016. Moreover, we find that firms that have exhibited environmental wrongdoing are also more likely to engage in beyond-compliance activities, which may be a form of greenwashing. Thus, more formal and informal regulatory oversight has the potential to spur positive environmental actions. This has implications for a firm's corporate social responsibility actions as well as for climate change regulatory policy. K E Y W O R D Sbeyond-compliance actions, climate change, corporate social responsibility, environmental policy, GHG emissions, institutional theory, regulation

Research has traditionally portrayed voluntary corporate responsibility (CR) actions toward employees as episodic, discretionary activities that individual firms take in response to marginalized, fringe “gadflies.” In this study, which examines numerous external pressures from a firm’s institutional and task environment, our findings suggest more than simple episodic responses that vary from firm to firm, but rather a conformity of action with respect to a firm’s voluntary activities toward its employees. In the absence of explicit mandates, firms are voluntarily strengthening employee relations, especially if they are increasing employee-relations concerns. Overall, external pressures significantly affect the CR activities that firms direct toward employees.

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