Family business research suggests that the population of family firms cannot be regarded as a homogenous group. Therefore, with respect to tax avoidance, we analyze the role of the founder as one dimension of family firm heterogeneity. Specifically, we consider socioemotional wealth loss aversion and find that founders may affect the level of tax avoidance not only when they have direct influence (i.e., serving as CEO) but also when they possess solely indirect influence (i.e., having substantial ownership or a seat on the board). Overall, our results suggest that founders remain attached to their firms despite giving up executive positions.

This study simultaneously distinguishes between private family firms, private nonfamily firms, public family firms, and public nonfamily firms. We show that private family firms avoid taxes less than public family firms and public nonfamily firms; however, we do not find a difference between private family firms and private nonfamily firms. Therefore, building on family firm heterogeneity, our results indicate that tax avoidance in private family firms differs depending on the involvement of nonfamily owners and/or managers. We find that private family firms that are wholly owned and managed by family members indeed avoid taxes less than private nonfamily firms.

No abstract