No abstract

Throughout this study, the authors propose possible agreements among different food producers, in order to develop a new better conceived diet for the future generations, by using a coopetitive approach and game theory. Specifically, the authors shall consider food producers and sellers of vegan (respectively, vegetarian) and non-vegan (or non-vegetarian) food. The coopetitive approach used by the authors provides a mathematical game theory model, which could help producers of vegan food a simpler entry in the market and free significant publicity. Meanwhile, the model could allow producers of non-vegetarian food a smooth transaction to vegetarian and vegan production. In particular, authors propose an agreement setting among McDonald's and Muscle of Wheat, because they think that Muscle of Wheat cannot enter a global market without the help of a large food producer already in the market. The game theory model represents an asymmetric R&D alliance between McDonald's and Muscle of Wheat.

In this paper, we face the problem of global feeding sustainability and related environmental issues, with a strong attention to possible public heath improvements. In particular, we consider food producers and sellers of vegan (or vegetarian) and non-vegan (or non-vegetarian) food and we build up feasible and measurable contracts between two different food producers, in order to construct a more sustainable and healthier diet for future generations. At this aim, we use co-opetitive approach by means of game theory. Our co-opetitive approach consists in a game theory structure, which could help small local producers of vegan food a simpler entry in the global market and free significant publicity. At the same time, our mathematical construction suggests how big global producers/sellers of non-vegetarian food could develop a smooth rapid transaction to a more sustainable and healthier production/supply. Specifically, our game constitutes an asymmetric R&D alliance between McDonald’s and the local producer of the so called vegan product "Muscle of Wheat". We finally show a quantitative compromise solution, obtained by the Kalai-Smorodinsky principles, in a numerical study (exemplary) case.

In this paper, we will use coopetitive game theory to analyze a case of real coopetition among port companies, for what concerns loading and unloading of goods, within a competitive management scenario of marine transportation activities. Our research consists of the analysis of a study case involving coopetition between two real companies from which we obtained the financial and contractual data allowing us to define two modeling payoff functions, both of them based on real agreements and tariffs. We recognize actual coopetition and an asymmetric R&D alliance in this type of agreement, where a bigger enterprise deals with a smaller competitor, in order to capture more value from their activities. In particular, our model will show a precise coopetitive bi-dimensional trajectory within which we suggest, after a quantitative analysis, different kinds of solutions: the purely coopetitive solution, a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and, finally, a transferable utility Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our methods provide specific strategy procedures determining win-win solutions for both.

In this article, we consider the coexistence of competing actors within a specific eco-industrial park. The competing firms dynamics evolves by means of an interplay agreement determined among the competitors themselves. In particular, we show a possible scenario in which the selected eco-industrial competitors could greatly benefit from a coopetitive interaction, within their common eco-park, while improving the general conditions of a near residential area. The associated dynamical coopetitive agreement, aims at the growth and improvement of the firms themselves and of their industrial network (within a virtuous environmental path). As an example, we assume the existence of two competitors selling the same good on the same market, so that, from a competitive point of view, we construct a classic Cournot duopoly model upon which we build up a multidimensional coopetitive agreement. Our eco-friendly deal allows to “enlarge the pie” of possible gains by diminishing sunk costs and other forms of costs, especially the environmental costs associated to the management of urban waste recycling. Consequently, we suggest production methods and production quantitative profiles in order to “share the gains fairly”. We show a complete mathematical analysis of our new economic game and show some of its possible and relevant solutions.