Behavioral economics provides insights about the development of effective incentives for physicians to deliver high-value care. It suggests that the structure and delivery of incentives can shape behavior, as can thoughtful design of the decision-making environment. This article discusses several principles of behavioral economics, including inertia, loss aversion, choice overload, and relative social ranking. Whereas these principles have been applied to motivate personal health decisions, retirement planning, and savings behavior, they have been largely ignored in the design of physician incentive programs. Applying these principles to physician incentives can improve their effectiveness through better alignment with performance goals. Anecdotal examples of successful incentive programs that apply behavioral economics principles are provided, even as the authors recognize that its application to the design of physician incentives is largely untested, and many outstanding questions exist. Application and rigorous evaluation of infrastructure changes and incentives are needed to design payment systems that incentivize high-quality, cost-conscious care.

This is the first comprehensive review of the scale and scope economies of physician practice in nearly two decades. The research results do not appear to have changed much; nor has much changed in physician practice organization.

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IMPORTANCE Although independent charity patient assistance programs improve patient access to costly prescription drugs, recent federal investigations have raised questions about their potential to increase pharmaceutical spending and to violate the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. Little is known about the design of the programs, patient eligibility, or drug coverage.OBJECTIVE To examine the eligibility criteria of the independent charity patient assistance programs and the drugs covered by them. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTSDescriptive cross-sectional study of the 6 largest independent charities offering patient assistance programs for patients including, but not limited to, Medicare beneficiaries in 2018. These charities offered 274 different disease-specific patient assistance programs. Drugs were identified for subgroup analysis that had any use reported on the Medicare Part D spending dashboard and any off-patent brand-name drugs that incurred more than $10 000 in Medicare spending per beneficiary in 2016.EXPOSURES Support by independent charity patient assistance programs. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURESThe primary outcomes were the characteristics of patient assistance programs, including assistance type, insurance coverage (vs uninsured), and income eligibility. The secondary outcomes were the cost of the drugs covered by the patient assistance programs and the coverage of expensive off-patent brand-name drugs vs substitutable generic drugs.